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This dissertation consists of two essays that explore firms’ strategies to sustain asymmetric 
alliances and gain benefits from dyadic relationships. The research foci are on the alliance 
strategies of the firms that possess limited internal and social resources versus their alliance 
partners. With these two essays that include theory development and empirical tests, I provide 
my observation and thinking on two research questions: “How can low-centrality firms keep 
long-term alliances with high-centrality firms (in a network of interfirm alliances)?” and “How 
can small- and medium-sized firms exploit their alliances with large and resourceful firms to 
perform better?”  
      In Essay One, I study the longevity of interfirm equity alliances with partners that are 
asymmetric in centrality in a network formed by firms and their interfirm alliance ties. Research 
points to a short duration of such alliances because partners with their disparity in network 
resources experience power imbalance and integration difficulties. I contend that centrality-
asymmetric partners are complementary in information and social status, and have less inter-
partner competition. A moderate asymmetry that balances hazards and benefits should enhance 
alliance duration. I find that Japanese overseas equity alliances with intermediate levels of 
centrality asymmetry between parent firms sustain longer than those that with low or high 
asymmetry. The U-curved effects of centrality asymmetry on alliance dissolution are reduced by 
external competition that enhances partner cohesion while enlarged by partners’ firm-specific 
uncertainty that expands their information disparity. 
        I use Essay One to examine the alliance of socially asymmetric partners. Through 
analysis of the relationships between partners’ social asymmetry and alliance duration, I combine 
the homophily view and complementary perspectives in explaining alliance longevity. I also 
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contrast theories that stress homophily with those that emphasize complementarity in explaining 
alliance longevity. As dyadic relationships constitute the elementary units of a network, my 
research on alliance longevity has implications for the evolutionary view of network dynamics. 
Meanwhile, my study also provides management implications to socially asymmetric alliances 
by suggesting the strategies lower-centrality firms can use to sustain their partnership.  
      Essay Two investigates Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises’ (SMEs) strategies to 
exploit their alliances with large and resourceful firms to enhance their internationalization. Prior 
research that emphasizes the competition between alliance partners suggests strategies for SMEs 
to protect themselves from value misappropriation. This study stresses on partner cooperation 
and examines SMEs’ post-formation strategies to better use asymmetric alliances with their weak 
power and limited capabilities. Analysis of Japanese small- and medium-sized trading companies 
(SMTCs) shows that they could use their alliances with Keiretsu-affiliated trading companies 
(Sogo Shosha) to speed up international expansion, especially when they possess a host country 
portfolio that is dissimilar to that of the latter. However, these benefits would diminish when 
those SMTCs become more embedded in these dyadic relationships, or they have alliances with 
multiple Sogo Shosha. 
  My first goal in Essay Two is to enhance the understanding of firm’s strategies in the 
alliances where a high level of partner asymmetry exists. This study suggests strategies for small 
firms by investigating the alliance outcome to individual firms. Prior research recognizes that 
asymmetric alliance is an exchange between small firms’ unique competitive advantages and 
large firms’ financial and social resource. My study reminders that small firm could leverage 
their social value to gain more benefits from the alliances. I advocate a collaboration view of 
asymmetric alliances that small firms may enhance their cooperation with large firms rather than 
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focusing on protecting themselves or the inter-partner competition. This study also reveals that 
the alliance, as a nonhierarchical governance structure, would affect the weaker partner in their 
international expansion.  
      This dissertation employs mainly two databases: Overseas Japanese companies1 and the 
Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS). The former provides the equity 
alliances (joint ventures) of Japanese firms in foreign countries while the latter contains firm-
level information. A number of academic articles using these databases have been published 
using these two databases. My use of these data is different from the previous studies in two 
aspects. First, I study interfirm alliances while earlier studies mainly used these data for research 
on FDI and multinational enterprises. Second, I use the late period of the data (1990-2009) while 
previous studies used the 1987-2001 period2. Japanese firms’ international expansion began in 
the 1970s and amounted to a phenomenon in the next decades, knitting a worldwide network of 
multinational enterprises, joint ventures and subsidiaries. My observation on Japanese foreign 
direct investment (FDI) also creates knowledge about the internationalization strategies of 
Japanese firms.  
  
                                                 
1 Overseas Japanese Companies, as in its Japanese original title 海外進出企業総, is a database operated by Toyo 
Keizai Inc.  




The main body of this dissertation consists of two essays that include theory parts and 
quantitative empirical tests. Chapter 1 is an introduction and theory review of the dissertation. 
The two essays are divided into ten chapters. Essay One makes four chapters. Chapter 2 is the 
introduction that surveys current theories and empirical findings of the longevity of socially 
asymmetric alliance and the research potentials. Chapter 3 presents the argumentation and 
hypotheses. Chapter 4 is the empirical study that tests the hypotheses. The empirical results are 
stated in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents a conclusion and discussion on the implications for 
relevant research and management practice.      
      Essay Two spreads over Chapter 7-11. Chapter 7 is the introduction that opens a 
discussion of small firms’ strategy in asymmetric alliances. Chapter 8 is the theory and 
hypotheses. Chapter 9 is an empirical study using a data of Japanese small- and medium-sized 
trading companies. A conclusion of the empirical findings is in Chapter 10, and the theoretical 
contribution and management implications of the essay are discussed in Chapter 11.  
 Figures and tables are stated in the text, with a list of titles and pages on Page 8.  
Footnotes are used to explain terms. The citation of references is in the style of Strategic 
Management Journal. A bibliography at the end of this document states the publication 
information of the cited studies. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Theory Foundation 
1.1 Motivation: partner asymmetries in alliances  
Interfirm alliances, as an arrangement of resource exchange or a firm strategy (Gulati, 1998), 
have become a prevalent governance structure in the last decades. The management of alliances 
has aroused the research interests of cross-discipline scholars. The economists of transaction cost 
theory view the alliance as an outcome of firms’ reducing cost and improving efficiency 
(Hennart, 1991; Williamson, 1991a). Scholars of resource-based view emphasize that strategic 
alliance could exploit the value of partner firms through an innovative combination of their 
resources (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). Other than those theories, the sociological 
perspective favors the social context in which firms are embedded (Granovetter, 1985). Network 
theorists view the alliance as the basic unit of interfirm network, asserting that the key precursors, 
processes, and outcomes associated with alliances are shaped by the interfirm network (Gulati, 
1998). From a perspective of resource exchange, interfirm alliance not only provides conduits for 
partners to exchange resource but also deepens the awareness, trust, and commitment to partners 
(Larson, 1992). Firms could also use alliances to exchange social status and reputation with 
others (Podolny, 1993). This exchange of internal and social resources through alliances 
enhances firms’ survival and competition. 
       The research on interfirm alliance has spawned many research questions. Gulati (1998) 
categorizes them to several topics: the formation of alliances; governance alliances; dynamic 
evolution of alliances and networks; performance of alliances; and performance of firms in 
alliances. This dissertation focuses on two major topics: the dynamic evolution of alliances and 
networks, and performance of firms in alliances. When these two topics are broad enough to 
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include many deprived sub-topics and research questions, I focus my research on the partner 
asymmetry in alliances.  
According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word asymmetry originated from the 
Greek word asymmetria that means “lack of proportion”. Asymmetry differs from dissimilarity. 
As each firm is dissimilar in certain aspects, the dissimilarity between partners exists in every 
alliance. Partner asymmetry, as I define it, concerns the dissimilar attributes of partners that are 
significantly relevant to alliance management, such as alliance formation, operation, and 
longevity. Partners could be asymmetric internal resources, such as size, equity, cash flow or 
business scales, and technologies (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Asymmetries also exist in 
partners’ social structural attributes, such as network resources, social status and prestige (Ahuja, 
Polidoro, and Mitchell, 2009; Polidoro, Ahuja, and Mitchell, 2011).    
      Research shows that partner asymmetry has two-sided effects on strategic alliances. On 
one hand, firms seek for partners that complement themselves in capabilities and proprietary 
knowledge (Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell, 2004; Madhok and Tallman, 1998). Asymmetries 
in resources and capabilities motivate alliance formation (Hamel, 1991). The alliance with 
dissimilar partners enables firms to seize new business opportunities. The international joint 
venture, for instance, is usually an alliance of foreign partner ﬁrms’ superior intangible assets, 
e.g. technology, marketing and management skill and the local partners’ domestic knowledge. 
Partner asymmetry not only encourages firms to form alliances but also continues to generate 
cohesive force throughout the course of cooperation (Colombo, 2003; Kale and Singh, 2007) 
because partner firms need to learn from each other and exchange complementary resources 
(Kogut and Zander, 1993). These studies suggest that partner asymmetries have a positive 
influence on the alliance stability and outcome.  
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      On the other hand, partner asymmetry could engender destabilizing factors and drive the 
alliance to dissolve. The resource endowment of a firm determines its contribution to the 
partnership. Alliance partners are concerned with opportunism and free-riding behaviors when 
partners are asymmetric in resources. When the partners perceive that their benefits mismatch 
their contribution, or their gains fail to compensate the commitment, conflicts and rivalry will 
amount (Arino and De La Torre, 1998). Empirical evidence shows that joint ventures involving 
technology transfer are more vulnerable and likely to fail due to opportunistic behavior and 
leakage of firm-specific assets (Park and Ungson, 1997). Partner asymmetry could also create a 
power imbalance in the alliance which harms partner cooperation (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997).  
        Although extant research has found that partner asymmetry is relevant to the longevity of 
alliances, it leaves out spaces for further studies. The literature has developed two major streams 
of research on partners’ asymmetry and alliance longevity. The first line of research focuses on 
the partners’ asymmetry in their attributes, such as resource, management style and culture (Park 
and Russo, 1996). Scholars find that attribute asymmetry breeds internal tension to tear apart the 
alliance (Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Park and Ungson, 1997) while breeding mutual benefits to 
glue partners together (Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell, 2000; Kogut, 1988). The second line of 
research stresses the network embeddedness that changes the partners’ partnering choice and 
behaviors in a dyad (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1998).  The literature shows that the partners’ 
difference in network centrality fosters information asymmetry and power imbalance that impede 
alliance formation and encourages dissolution (Gulati, 1995; Polidoro et al., 2011). Some other 
studies show that the centrality asymmetry between partners creates cooperation opportunities 
for new and specific knowledge as well (Ahuja et al., 2009). As the interfirm relationships 
between alliance partners contain their relationships in a dyad and their connections at the 
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network level, partner asymmetry could have dual effects on alliance longevity. However, prior 
studies of this line highlight the hazards of partner asymmetry while they have not paid enough 
attention to its benefits (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Polidoro et al., 2011). Motivated by this 
research potential, I examine the combined effects of partner asymmetry on alliance longevity in 
Essay One.  
      Another interesting question deals with the influences of partner asymmetry on firm 
performance, especially on the performance of the weaker partner. Extant studies show that 
alliances usually produce unbalanced outcomes to partners, with one partner benefiting more 
from the alliance than the other (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Park and Russo, 1996; Reich and 
Mankin, 1986). Large and network-central (stronger) firms that have advantages in social and 
economic resources are more capable of exploring complementarities from their alliances (Ahuja 
et al., 2009; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999). The weaker firms, on the contrary, could only have 
disproportionate return from the alliance with powerful partners. Although partners could expect 
unbalanced outcomes from an alliance (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Park and Russo, 1996), 
this asymmetry could arouse distrust and frictions (Das and Teng, 2000a, 2001). Another 
concern that socially asymmetric alliance encourages opportunism, where stronger firms could 
apply their power to grab benefits and enforce unfair value splitting (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; 
Greve et al., 2010) while weaker firms usually could not secure their interest. This risk of 
misappropriation could undermine the faith of the weaker firms to keep their cooperation with 
powerful partners. Recent studies have been discussing the protection strategies for peripheral 
firms to reduce misappropriation and opportunism, such as choosing trustful partners and the 
type of alliances (Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012; Katila, Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt, 2008; 
Yang, Zheng, and Zhao, 2014). However, extant studies provide little knowledge of the 
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strategies for the weak firm to achieve their goals of alliances. In Essay Two, I study the alliance 




1.2 Background of Essay One: partner asymmetry and alliance longevity 
Alliance longevity could be predetermined in alliance contracts signed by the partners in the 
preformation stage. However, in many cases alliance termination is an unexpected outcome. The 
issue of alliance instability comprises unplanned dissolution and major changes in contracts 
(Beamish and Inkpen, 1998). Studies show that the instability rates of alliances are as high as a 
percentage between 30% and 50% (Kogut, 1988; Park and Ungson, 1997). Studies of 
international business show that alliances (joint ventures) are less successful and less stable than 
wholly-owned subsidiaries (Chang, Chung, and Moon, 2013; Hennart, Kim, and Zeng, 1998).  
      Researchers are aware that the dissimilarity between alliance partners can be one of the 
factors that affect unplanned dissolution of alliances. The literature has developed two major 
streams of research on this issue. The first line of research focuses on the partners’ asymmetry in 
their attributes, such as resource, management style and culture(Beamish and Inkpen, 1998; Park 
and Ungson, 1997). The other line of research deals with the partners’ asymmetry in social 
resources (Ma, Rhee, and Yang, 2012; Polidoro et al., 2011).    
      Partner asymmetries in firm attributes. This line of research has a concentration on the 
dissimilar attributes of the partners and their unequal contribution to the partnership. Scholars 
view the alliance as a hybrid form of a hierarchical entity and the free market (Borys and 
Jemison, 1989; Williamson, 1991b). Scholars of the resource-based view assume that partners’ 
resources and capabilities lay the foundation for their contributions to the partnership (Cui, 
Calantone, and Griffith, 2011). They argue that partners’ asymmetries in resources and 
contribution cause frictions and conflicts in collaboration and alliance dissolution (Arino and De 
La Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996). Some other studies argue that partner competition and inter-firm 
rivalry create instability and lead to alliance dissolution (Das and Teng, 2000a; Kogut, 1989). 
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Power contest is usually used to explain the alliance strategies of firms (Beamish and Inkpen, 
1998; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Recent studies argue that a reason for alliance dissolution be 
the firms’ pursuit of new partners which provide better quality and benefits than the current ones 
(Greve, Mitsuhashi, and Baum, 2013). Although the hazards of partner asymmetry are well 
theorized and supported by empirical evidence, some other scholars believe that partners’ 
resource dissimilarity creates complementariness (Dussauge et al., 2000; Kogut, 1989). They 
also argue that similarity can create redundancy and rivalry, which harm partner cohesion (Chen, 
1996; Cui et al., 2011). 
     The challenges of this line of research lie in two aspects: First, it is hard to identify 
resource complementarity in empirical studies. Resource dissimilarity implies the possibility of 
complementarity. However, partners’ dissimilarity in resources does not guarantee that the 
partners can complement each other. The second difficulty concerns the question whether the 
motivations of alliance formation are the same to that of alliance dissolution. Alliance is 
supposed to be a governance structure that allows firms to access to one another’s resources. The 
resource-based view emphasizes the sustainability of competitive resources of a firm (Barney, 
1991). According to this academic perspective, firms may have efforts to make to gain the 
competitive advantages of their alliance partners. As such, partners’ resource dissimilarity could 
be an incentive of alliance formation and also a source of opportunism and frictions in the 
partnership.  
      Social embeddedness and network centrality. Some other scholars focus their attention 
on the social side of firms, adopting a network perspective that partner firms are embedded in the 
network that links other firms. They argue that firms have considerations that beyond the 
economic exchanges due to their network embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985), which affects their 
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preferences in choosing partners and the behaviors after alliance formation (Gulati, 1998; Gulati 
and Gargiulo, 1999). In general, this line of research shifts the research focus on interfirm 
relationships in dyads to a network-level scope. 
      Alliance partners with the social considerations may have a relationship that is beyond 
economic considerations. Partners’ prior relations can increase the possibility to form new ties 
and strengthen tie stability because the repeated interaction between partners creates knowledge-
based trust and partner-specific experience (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Polidoro et al., 2011). 
Indirect ties are supposed to encourage collaboration because common partners can monitor the 
opportunism and misbehavior in alliances (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997; Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 
1997).  
     Some network scholars seem to have agreed on a view that partners’ dissimilarity in 
network centrality has a negative effect on alliance stability. Network centrality refers to a firm’s 
positional embeddedness in the network, i.e. to what extent the focal firm is connected to other 
actors. The more ties the focal firm has, the more central it is in the network. Firms that occupy a 
central position in the network are supposed to have informational and reputational advantages 
(Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). Central firms are popular as potential partners with their rich 
information, and they might enjoy a high status in terms of their experience in partnering (Ahuja 
et al., 2009; Podolny, 1993) while peripheral firms are constrained in partnering choice due to 
their poor connection to the network. Studies show that central firms are less likely to form 
alliances with peripheral firms and more likely to break up their partnerships even if they have 
formed alliances (Gulati, 1995; Polidoro et al., 2011). Peripheral firms have to give up some 
benefits to attract central firms (Ahuja et al., 2009).  
      Furthermore, alliances with partners of asymmetric network centrality are unstable due to 
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unbalance return and power imbalance. Central firm occupying high-status will obtain greater 
benefits than its peripheral partner (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Das, Sen, and Sengupta, 1998). 
Central firms can use a large portfolio of alliance partners, and their skills and information to 
leverage beyond-expectation benefits from the alliance partners (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Zollo, 
Reuer, and Singh, 2002). As status is a valuable capital and resource, central firms that usually 
enjoy a high status in alliance experiences would be concerned with status-deflating and the free-
riding due to the alliances with peripheral firms (Ahuja et al., 2009). On the other hand, 
peripheral firms face misappropriation from their powerful partners (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). 
They lack channels to spread the negative behavior of their central partners to the network. Thus, 
central partners are less concerned with the reputation loss due to their misbehavior in the 
alliance. As a result, both central firms and peripheral firms have incentives to deviate from the 
partnership (Greve et al., 2010; Polidoro et al., 2011). 
      A problem of this line of research lies in that those studies take the power construct of an 
interfirm network exactly as the power construct two alliances partners have in their dyadic 
relationship. The interfirm relationships between two alliance partners exist at two levels: at the 
network level and the dyadic level. It is true that the network centrality gap between partners 
creates a power imbalance. However, this power imbalance could be modified by the dyadic 
relationship. Once allied with central firms the peripheral firms could also enjoy the information 
flow through the former. The informational advantages of central firms in preformation stages 
are reduced as the alliance facilitate information exchange between partners.  
      This line of research also underestimates the interdependence between central firms and 
peripheral firms. Peripheral firms could use the alliance with central firms to enhance their 
visibility in the network and access to the network resources of the latter (Stuart, Hoang, and 
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Hybels, 1999). Allying with central firms also help peripheral firms to enhance their capabilities 
to survive and compete with rivals (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). From the perspectives 
of central firms, the alliance with peripheral firms can bring control advantages because 
peripheral firms would sometimes sacrifice their interest (Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad, 1989). 
Moreover, central firms also need to keep peripheral firms as own partners and reduce the 
partnering choice of other central competitors (Gimeno, 2004; Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986; 
Silverman and Baum, 2002). Prior studies that have not considered both the benefits and hazard 
of partner asymmetry leave out research potentials.   
1.3 Background of Essay Two: partner asymmetry and small firms’ strategies 
Before investigating the benefits asymmetric alliances bring to the weak party of the partnership, 
it is necessary to understand reasons that a resourceful firm would ally with a resource-poor 
partner in the first place. Extant studies show that allying with resource-rich firms is a way for 
resource-poor firms to obtain external resources while they could maintain independence (Gulati, 
1998; Gulati and Sytch, 2007). For instance, start-ups that have promising innovation and 
technological capability would form alliances with established firms that have rich resources in 
financial, marketing and creditability (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Katila et al., 2008) with the 
purpose that they could use the latter’s resource to develop the technologies to products and 
commercialize them to the market. Research shows that some small- and medium-sized firms 
could enhance their survival likelihood and competitive capabilities through the alliance with 
large firms (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Gimeno, 2004). For large firms or the firms that 
are rich in critical resources such as capital, technology and market coverage, the alliances with 
some firms that lack such resources could access them to the cutting-edge innovation and new 
technologies because large firms usually are not so innovative (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). 
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Although large and resourceful firms enjoy informational advantages in product development 
and marketing (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993), they 
need to use alliance partners to diversify searching risk. Moreover, being powerful in controlling 
the production and distribution channels, large and resourceful firms are capable of appropriating 
the values created by the alliances. 
      However, benefiting from such asymmetric alliances with large and resourceful firms 
could be a complicated task for small firms. First, it remains a question whether partner 
asymmetries facilitate value creation. Although partner asymmetry could potentially create 
complementary between partners, many studies look at the complementarity of partners without 
establishing causality between resource asymmetry and value creation. Recent research shows 
that the power imbalance created by partners’ asymmetry in social status negatively affects the 
value creation of alliances (Ma et al., 2012). Some other studies also show that unstable 
collaboration between partners due to partner asymmetry could lead to the failure of alliances, 
such as the underperformance of the firms and their equity alliances (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004). 
We still need more research on the influence of partner asymmetry in value creation.  
      Second, most of the studies on asymmetric alliance focus on the issue of value 
appropriation and splitting. Some studies view the value splitting as the results of power contest 
and believe that powerful partner takes the lion’s share (Katila et al., 2008). Most of the studies 
assume that misappropriation concerns the weaker partner more because they are inferior in 
bargaining power. For instance, unsuccessful alliances would affect start-ups more because they 
could lose their new technologies and core competence to their established partners (Alvarez and 
Barney, 2001; Katila et al., 2008). In some cases, the firms that are less connected to an interfirm 
network also lack the capability to disseminate the misbehavior of their partners in the alliance. 
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As such, recent research has suggested that the weaker party of an alliance should use protection 
strategy to resist value misappropriation and opportunistic behaviors. Research on technological 
and R&D alliances suggests firms advantaged in technology use protection to avoid 
misappropriation such as patent and secrecy (Katila et al., 2008), arrangements to reduce 
dependence (Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012). They are also advised to form exploitation 
alliances rather than exploration ones with giant and established firms (Yang et al., 2014). 
      Although those protection strategies add to the capabilities of the weaker party in their 
completion with powerful firms for value splitting, they might not fit the nature of asymmetric 
alliances. Given that small and weak firms are weak in bargaining power and capability to secure 
their economic interest, the focusing on the intra-alliance competition might not be a profound 
strategy. Furthermore, that strategy could also arouse mistrust and rivalry in the partnerships and 
lead to the instability of alliances (Das and Teng, 2000a; Park and Ungson, 2001).  
      Other than the discussion about the splitting of created economic value between partners, 
my research advocates a different view that small and weak firms should leverage their 
advantages for their desired benefits from the alliance. The benefits of the alliance include not 
only the rent-generating but also the social connectedness. The firms with less social connections 
could use their partners that are rich in social resources as springboards to explore new 
cooperation opportunities with others. In this sense, the weaker partners of alliances can shift 
their attention on economic value creation and appropriation to an overall gain-or-loss evaluation 
of the asymmetric alliance. The key to crack down the issue of the asymmetric alliance is to 
answer the question: what benefits could asymmetric alliances bring to small and weak firms? 
There are two kinds of value associated with interfirm alliances. The first kind of value is the 
economic value produced by partners with their alliances or by partners’ creative combination of 
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their resources. Previous research of value creation and appropriation mainly deals with this 
economic value. The second kind of value is generated by the social resources that firms share 
with their partners, such as status, knowledge, creditability and network resources (Lavie, 2006). 
We still need more studies that look at how this social value could be generated through 
asymmetric alliances.  
      In Essay Two, I study this issue through exploring how small firms obtain network 
resources from their large and resourceful partners. By showing that the weaker party faces the 
tradeoff between desired resources and independence, I remind that alliance is not only a vehicle 
of resource-pooling but also a platform for resource exchange. I use this study to gain the 
knowledge about weaker party’s strategies in their asymmetric alliances with powerful and 
resourceful partners. With data of Japanese trading companies and their international expansion, 
my study reveals that small-and medium-sized firms can use their alliances with industrial giant 
firms to overcome smallness and newness in international expansion.  
1.4 Resource dependence theory and alliances 
In the management research, resource dependence theory (RDT) has been widely used to analyze 
firms’ relationships with their environment. The core of this theory lies in its theorizing the 
sources and consequences of interdependence in interorganizational relations. This theory asserts 
that firms have to ensure survival and autonomy while maintaining exchange relations with other 
organizations (Davis and Cobb, 2010). In their book The External Control of Organizations, 
Peffer and Salancik (2003: xxv) wrote: “Resource dependence was originally developed to 
provide an alternative perspective to economic theories of mergers and board interlocks, and to 
understand precisely the type of interorganizational relations that have played such a large role in 
recent ‘market failures’”. These authors provide a perspective on the interorganizational relations 
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and the interdependencies between firms. According to them, as interdependence creates 
uncertainty, firms have to manage their dependence on external organizations. This perspective 
inspires the author of this dissertation and becomes the fundamental of the academic thoughts of 
the two essays. 
      Resource dependence theory distinguishes itself from other theories with its emphasis on 
power, or the control over critical resources (Ulrich and Barney, 1984). It assumes that firms 
struggle to reduce others’ power over them and increase their power over others. Many relevant 
studies investigate the source of power and firms’ strategies to seek and manage power (Emerson, 
1962; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976). Emerson (1962) constructs a basic model of exchange-based 
power. He views the power of A over B comes from control of resources B needs from A. So B’s 
dependent on A is the power A has over B. The exchanges between A and B make their 
interdependence.  
       As RDT deals with the fundamental relationships between firms and the environment, 
scholars find its power in explaining alliances. Almost on its birth, scholars had used RDT as a 
primary theoretical perspective to explain joint ventures (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976), and, later on, 
other interfirm relationships such as strategic alliances, joint-marketing agreements, and buyer-
supplier relationships. (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Oliver, 1990). Scholars believe that firms 
use alliances to absorb environmental constraints and reduce the dependence on others (Pfeffer 
and Nowak, 1976). In the recent development of RDT, scholars pay attention to the power 
construct between alliance partners. Casciaro and her colleague (2005) argue that the 
relationships between alliance partners consist of mutual dependence and power imbalance, 
which jointly determine the formation of strategic alliances. While the mutual dependence 
encourages two firms to form alliances, the power imbalance between them impedes partner 
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integration. Gulati and Sytch (2007) express the similar idea of power and stress the asymmetric 
interdependence between alliance partners. Yan and Gray (1994, 2001) believe that alliances 
occur when organizations are mutually dependent, but the partner controlling critical resources 
retains strategic control. 
      Scholars use RDT for industry-level analysis (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Katila et al., 
2008) as well as dyad- and firm-level analysis. Diestre and his colleague (2012) analyze how the 
asymmetry between firms affect their likelihoods to form alliances. Yang and his colleague 
(2014) emphasize the value misappropriation due to the asymmetries in learning capabilities, 
which could change the power construct in dyadic relationships. They suggest that the small and 
weak firms should form exploitation alliances with large and powerful firms, rather than 
exploration alliances, to avoid hazards.  
      Although most of the extant studies of RDT usually look at the preformation stage of 
alliances, RDT provides a useful framework for analysis of firms’ relationships in the post-
formation stage. Some RDT theorists try to distinguish power between power imbalance and 
mutual dependence in recent studies (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). They argue that the mutual 
dependence encourages alliance formation while a power imbalance deters firms to form 
alliances. Analogously, I argue that this notion could be applied in the post-formation stage. 
Since alliance is a hybrid governance form that allows firms to keep interdependence, a power 
imbalance could persist in the course of alliances (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999). At the 
formation of an alliance, all the power, responsibility and commitment reaches a balance, which 
then begins the imbalance and rebalance of power in the post-formation stage. The partner firms 
that fail to manage this imbalance tend to terminate the collaboration to avoid the negative 
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consequences of power imbalance, such as the rise of opportunism and misappropriation (Greve 
et al., 2010; Polidoro et al., 2011).  
     In Essay One, I ask the research question “what drive alliances to dissolve” and answer it 
using resource dependency theory. Existing evidence shows that joint ventures with 50%-50% 
division of equity are more stable than those with unbalanced equity structure (Blodgett, 1992). 
Ma and his colleagues (2012) find that the mismatch of equity structure and social status of 
partner firms leads to underperformance. These findings suggest that the power balance might 
encourage alliance duration while the power imbalance might separate partners. Studies that 
directly look at the power contest between partners also find the similar results (Greve et al., 
2010). When the powerful firm has power over its partner, the latter can have some resources to 
complement the former. As extant studies have not considered the value of the weak partner to 
the powerful one, the extant theories of the relationships between asymmetric partners and 
alliance longevity are incomplete. I use Essay One as a survey to discuss this issue and provide 
empirical tests on the theories I propose to explain the dissolution of interfirm alliances.       
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1.5 Network theory and alliances 
An interfirm network consists of firms (actors) and their relationships (ties) that link them 
(Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). The network structure refers to the pattern of these ties and the 
positions that firms occupy. Early research on networks focused on individuals’ ties, examining 
how the interpersonal networks shape firms’ behavior and performance. As scholars have 
extended network research from interpersonal to interorganizational ties, they have shifted the 
focus to how network shapes organizational behavior. Some scholars propose that organizations 
are embedded in social relations, and investigate the antecedents and consequences of this social 
embeddedness (Gulati, 1998).         
      In recent decades, “network resources” has become an often-used term in management 
research. Some scholars refer the social network of a focal firm as its network resources versus 
their internal resources (Ahuja et al., 2009; Gulati, 1998). Network resources include tangible 
and intangible assets, such as information, status, and reputation. Some scholars view a firm’s 
network as its source of information and knowledge (Kogut, 2000). Recent research asserts that 
network resources are outside the firms’ boundary but could be accessed to by firms (Lavie, 
2007).  
      The network perspective on alliance sustainability expands the dyadic analysis of partner 
resource dependency to a framework that highlights partners’ social embeddedness in 
collaboration (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Network theorists view 
the alliance formation and termination as the elements of the endogenous progress of network 
dynamics. From this perspective, firms’ alliance activities in forming and terminating alliances 
change the structure of the interfirm network, while the network structure in turn also affects 
firms’ preference in forming and terminating alliances (Ahuja, Soda, and Zaheer, 2012). 
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Network theorists often devote attention to problems of power (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; 
Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) while highlighting network resources as a 
source of power (Ma et al., 2012; Polidoro et al., 2011).     
Early research highlights that firms’ social relationships influence their organizational 
behavior and economic performance (Granovetter, 1985). They develop the concepts of three 
types of social embeddedness. Relational embeddedness denotes the relationships of dyadic ties 
(Granovetter, 1992). Scholars find that historical dyadic ties reinforce collaboration due to 
knowledge-based trust (Polidoro et al., 2011). Structural embeddedness refers to the network 
centrality the firms possess. It considers not only direct ties but also firms’ positions to its 
neighbors (Granovetter, 1992). Burt (1997) asserts that the positions firms possess in a network 
versus its partners determine its capabilities in acquiring information and constitutes the power 
of the focal firm over its partners.  
      The third sort of network embeddedness is more relevant to the network perspective of 
firms’ alliance activities. Scholars use positional embeddedness to refer to the extent to which a 
firm is linked to others in the network (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). A firm with many partners 
occupies the central position in the network and has a high degree of network centrality. Thanks 
to their high connectedness to the interfirm network, central firms enjoy a vast amount of 
information in-flow from partners (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). Their central position also sends 
to other firms positive signals of quality and creditability in partnering and alliance activities 
(Gulati, 1995; Podolny, 1993). The advantages of information and status in partnering enable 
central firms to reduce production cost, enhance reputation, as well as access to other prominent 
firms (Podolny, 1993, 1994; Stuart, 1998). Following these research, I contend that the 
heterogeneity of network centrality across firms creates a hierarchy of network power. 
 29 
 
      As such, I define socially asymmetric alliances as the alliances formed by two partners 
that possess different levels of positional embeddedness, i.e. network centrality, in the interfirm 
network (Ahuja et al., 2009; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). This centrality asymmetry between 
partners constitutes a power imbalance that impedes the alliance formation between central and 
peripheral firms and encourages the dissolution of such alliances (Gulati, 1995; Polidoro et al., 
2011). This perspective, however, views the power construct of a dyad as the same to the power 
construct of an interfirm network. It neither explains the heterogeneity of centrality asymmetry 
across alliances nor provides strategies for firms to manipulate this centrality asymmetry for 
benefits. As such, research of this line needs further development to gain a better understanding 
of firms’ network-embedded alliance activities. As an early attempt, Essay One serves to 
examine the relationships between partners’ asymmetric network centrality and the longevity of 
their alliances.       
 
     













Power Imbalance and Partner Complementarity:  
The Longevity of Socially Asymmetric Alliances 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the duration of interfirm equity alliances with partners that are 
asymmetric in network centrality. Research points to a short duration of such alliances because 
partners with their disparity in network resources experience power imbalance and integration 
difficulties. I contend that centrality-asymmetric partners are complementary in information and 
social status, and have less inter-partner competition so that a moderate asymmetry that balances 
hazards and benefits enhances alliance duration. My empirical study also shows that Japanese 
overseas equity alliances with intermediate levels of centrality asymmetry between parent firms 
sustain longer than those with low or high asymmetry. The U-shaped effects of centrality 
asymmetry on alliance dissolution are reduced by external competition that enhances partner 
cohesion while potentially enlarged by partners’ firm-specific uncertainty that expands their 
informational disparity. 
 








Chapter 2 Introduction  
The network perspective on interfirm alliances highlights the influence of firms’ network 
embeddedness on the duration of alliances. Alliance partners with different network centrality 
span a social asymmetry in information, visibility, and status (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011; Gulati 
and Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, 1993). Prior research predicts a short longevity of such socially 
asymmetric alliances because partners with a disparity in network resources would experience 
power imbalance and integration difficulties (Polidoro et al., 2011). This perspective, while 
recognizing the hazard of partners’ social asymmetry, has not sufficiently included its potential 
benefits in creating complementarities and reducing inter-partner competition. As such, I am 
motivated to consider its dual effects and examine the overall influences of social asymmetry on 
alliance longevity.  
Research has shown that firms’ asymmetry in terms of their network resources and social 
status has relationships with their interorganizational exchange such as alliances, mergers and 
acquisitions (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010; Cowen, 2012; Shen, Tang, and Chen, 2014). The 
literature has developed two parallel perspectives of firms’ partnering patterns in their 
considerations of social asymmetry. The conclusion of the short longevity of socially asymmetric 
alliances is consistent with a homophily view of network dynamics (Ahuja et al., 2009). Its core 
arguments lie in the logic of partner compatibility that similar partners fit together and maintain 
long partnerships due to low levels of opportunism and coordination costs (Chung, Singh, and 
Lee, 2000; Ma et al., 2012; Polidoro et al., 2011). One the other hand, the literature has a 
complementary perspective that partners’ resource dissimilarity potentially creates 
complementarities and drives firms’ alliance behaviors (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). 
Socially asymmetric alliances allow low-centrality firms to access to their partners’ network 
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resources that enhance prestige, reputation, and survival (Cowen, 2012; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Stuart et al., 1999). Such alliances also enable 
high-centrality firms to apply their network power to take advantages of their partners in 
resource commitment and value splitting (Ahuja et al., 2009; Castellucci and Ertug, 2010). 
Moreover, socially asymmetric alliances arouse less inter-partner competition because partners 
would classify one another as being in a different social niche (Chen, 1996; Podolny, Stuart, and 
Hannan, 1996). As both the homophily view and complementary perspective stand to explain 
firms’ alliance behaviors in network embeddedness, any conclusion on the longevity of socially 
asymmetric alliances that considers only one perspective might be biased.  
Different from prior studies that emphasize either partner compatibility or 
complementarity alone (Chung et al., 2000; Polidoro et al., 2011), I combine these two 
perspectives to construct a conceptual model that includes both the positive and negative 
consequences of social asymmetry. Recognizing its hazards as discussed in the literature, I 
survey its potential benefits to obtain a balanced view of social asymmetry. I further test these 
effects in different contingencies, i.e. when partners face internal and external competition and 
have firm-specific uncertainty. In this study, I observe firms’ alliance behaviors through a lens of 
network theory (Gulati, 1998; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). I base the theoretical perspectives on 
resource dependence theory and interpret interfirm relationships using the concepts of 
interdependence and power (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Emerson, 1962; Gulati and Sytch, 
2007; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976). I also adopt the resource-based view of alliances that takes a 
firm’s alliance partners as its portfolio of network resources (Das and Teng, 2000b; Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven, 1996; Lavie, 2006, 2007). 
This study joins research on partners’ asymmetric interdependence in dyadic 
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relationships and extends the research foci from alliance formation and firm performance in 
alliances to the duration of alliances (Ahuja et al., 2009; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Gulati 
and Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati and Sytch, 2007). As most studies look at alliance formation, this 
study on alliance dissolution complements research of the evolution of alliances in a social 
context (Polidoro et al., 2011). The findings of socially asymmetric partners’ strategies to 
terminate and sustain alliances should be useful to both high-centrality and low-centrality firms, 
which need strategies to optimize their alliance portfolio and make better use their network 
resources (Lavie, 2007; Parise and Casher, 2003). Holding a network perspective, I aim to obtain 
an insight into firms’ alliance activities in network embeddedness by examining their 
fundamental partnering patterns as partner homophily or complementary. I also expect to infer 
some knowledge about the dynamics of network structure (Ahuja et al., 2012), especially, about 
the question how central firms maintain their centrality and how peripheral firms use strategies to 
move to central positions.  
I test my theory with a panel data of 693 equity alliances formed by two Japanese 
manufacturing firms in 39 foreign countries in the 1990-2009 period. Interfirm alliances and 
networks have been playing influential roles in the Japanese economy (Lincoln, Gerlach, and 
Ahmadjian, 1996). When Japanese firms undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) in host 
countries, they extend their social relationships across borders by forming alliances with each 
other. I examine such a network where Japanese firms are linked with equity alliances and do 
survival analysis on those alliances to explore the relationships between partners’ social 
asymmetry and alliance longevity.  
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Chapter 3 Hypotheses Development: Nonmonotonic Effects 
3.1 Socially asymmetric alliances 
I define socially asymmetric alliances as the alliances formed by the partners that possess 
different levels of network centrality, as such partners have the imbalance in the amount and 
quality of social resources they can obtain from a network. Central firms that are well connected 
to others can access rich information about market, industry and environment from their partners 
(Borgatti and Halgin, 2011; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Their high centrality signals the network 
about their experience and creditability in alliances, granting them a good reputation and high 
status in interfirm collaboration (Podolny, 1993, 1994). With these advantages in information 
and social status, central firms are more capable of locating and attracting new partners than their 
partners that have lower centrality (Ahuja et al., 2009; Gulati, 1995). As such, network centrality 
creates a heterogeneity of social resources across firms, with high-centrality firms possessing 
more social resources than low-centrality firms.  
The asymmetry in social resources creates partners’ interdependence and balances the 
power in alliances (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Pfeffer and Nowak, 
1976). Prior studies usually interpret the existence of socially asymmetric alliances as an 
exchange between the high-centrality firm’s social resources and the low-centrality firm’s 
internal capabilities. Socially asymmetric alliances are formed between established firms and 
technological startups with innovative capabilities (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Katila et al., 
2008), between local firms that are deeply embedded in the domestic network and multinational 
enterprises that bring in advanced technology and management (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997), or 
between giant banks and small financial institutes that possess large market shares of low-end 
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products (Podolny, 1993).  
Partners can maintain a power balance if they can keep their competitive advantages 
during collaboration. However, socially asymmetric partners usually possess different 
capabilities to absorb the advantages of their partners. With strong network support and rich 
information sources, high-centrality firms are capable of assimilating their low-centrality 
partners’ internal resources, such as knowledge and technology (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Kale 
and Singh, 2007). On the contrary, low-centrality firms need time to acquire social resources 
from their high-centrality partners, because the network structure does not change rapidly (Ahuja 
et al., 2012), and because current social relationships impede a firm to change its network 
(Sydow and Windeler, 1998). Hence, partners will retain their social asymmetry for a certain 
period while they could have reduced their asymmetries in internal resources through mutual 
learning and adaptation. This unbalanced development of partners’ competitive advantages could 
lead to a power imbalance that affects partners’ gain and loss from the alliance and motivates 
them to reconsider the partnership. 
3.2 Hazards of social asymmetry 
In socially asymmetric alliances, partners’ asymmetric capabilities in partnering opportunities 
constitute the source of power imbalance (Emerson, 1962). High-centrality firms with their 
informational advantages and social status are more capable in partnering (Ahuja et al., 2009; 
Gulati, 1995) while low-centrality firms are often short of information to locate potential partners 
and expose themselves to others (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati, 1995). As a result, low-centrality firms 
would attach great importance to their current alliances and become more dependent on their 
high-centrality partners. Partners should have agreed on value splitting and resource commitment 
through voluntary contracts at alliance formation (Gulati, 1998; Gulati and Sytch, 2007). The 
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power imbalance created by their social asymmetry, however, would distort such agreements and 
make both parties worse off.   
A power imbalance between socially asymmetric partners increases the risk of 
opportunism. High-centrality firms could apply their power to manipulate the alliance to meet 
their interest, or they can control the splitting of alliance outcomes (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; 
Castellucci and Ertug, 2010; Greve et al., 2010). Low-centrality firms with their weaker network 
support have difficulties to resist such misappropriations because they lack channels to 
disseminate the message about their partners’ misbehavior to the network, or introduce social 
monitoring into the alliance (Gulati, 1995). As such, a power imbalance motivates low-centrality 
firms to terminate the alliance to avoid hazards. Alternatively, the socially asymmetric alliances 
could favor low-centrality firms by allowing them to free ride on their high-centrality partners’ 
prestige and social status (Polidoro et al., 2011). High-centrality firms that are concerned with 
the discount of social status by allying with low-centrality firms would reconsider gains and loss 
from the alliances (Podolny, 1993). Moreover, studies applying game theory and mathematical 
modeling suggest that a substantial power imbalance reduces dyadic resource exchange and 
lowers the alliance benefits for both parties (Piskorski and Casciaro, 2006). High-centrality firms 
that have alternatives would abandon their low-centrality partners that are less useful for 
resource exchange. 
Socially asymmetry also impedes partners’ mutual integration and adaption. As partners 
are exposed to different levels of network information, they can incur high cost in 
communication and cooperation (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). Socially asymmetric partners that 
differ in partnering experience are also disadvantaged in partner compatibility that eases 
collaboration (Chung et al., 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). Furthermore, social asymmetry can create 
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the imbalance in partners’ obtaining benefits from the same alliance. High-centrality firms with 
multiple partners can combine their network resources to complement their capabilities (Ahuja et 
al., 2009; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Lavie, 2007) while low-centrality firms that are limited 
by their small alliance portfolio are less capable of exploiting partners’ value. The unbalanced 
gains would grow mistrust between partners and motivate them to deviate from the partnership. 
Prior research has recognized the hazards of power imbalance and integration difficulties 
and pointed to a short duration of socially asymmetric alliances. Polidoro (2011) and his 
colleagues find that the alliances between high-centrality and low-centrality firms are more likely 
to dissolve. Studies show that host-country firms that possess local networks would terminate 
international joint ventures with multinational enterprises once absorbed their technology and 
management expertise (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Research on entrepreneurship shows that 
established firms could be predator learners that exploit the core technology of startups through 
alliances and abandon them afterward (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). These theories and empirical 
findings suggest that the hazards that cause alliance dissolution increase with the levels of 
partners’ social asymmetry (see Figure 1). 
3.3 Benefits of social asymmetry 
Although social asymmetry harms dyadic collaboration, it creates opportunities for partners to 
complement each other in social resources. As discussed in the literature, low-centrality firms 
can use their high-centrality partners to enhance prestige and visibility in the network (Benjamin 
and Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1994; Stuart et al., 1999) and access third-party partners (Dussauge 
et al., 2004; Madhok and Tallman, 1998). Studies show that partnerships with high-centrality 
partners strengthen firms’ survival and competition capabilities (Singh and Mitchell, 2005; Stuart 
et al., 1999). As the accumulation of network resource requires a stable, long-term engagement, 
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low-centrality firms need to maintain durable alliances with high-centrality firms to secure these 
social benefits.  
Low-centrality firms, while obtaining network resources from their high-centrality 
partners, also feedback with social complementarity. First, a diverse alliance portfolio not only 
provides opportunities for value creation but also enlarges a firm’s knowledge pool and reduce 
its technological risk and market uncertainty (Ahuja et al., 2009; Jiang, Tao, and Santoro, 2010; 
Lavie, 2007). Low-centrality firms can provide unique and useful resources to enrich high-
centrality partners’ alliance portfolio (Lavie, 2006), and in some cases, complement them in 
capabilities and market coverage (Podolny, 1993). Second, low-centrality firms are loyal allies to 
share external competitive pressure because they incur a high cost in finding new partners and 
would make efforts to keep current ones. Maintaining multiple low-centrality partners 
strengthens high-centrality firms’ network power and reduces rivals’ partnering choice (Gimeno, 
2004; Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986; Silverman and Baum, 2002). Third, high-centrality firms 
can take the advantage of their low-centrality partners by applying network power. Research 
shows that low-centrality firms would make a compromise to remedy their dependence on 
partners. They would allow high-centrality partners to take ownership control of their equity 
alliances at formation (Ahuja et al., 2009), and continue to make more resource commitment in 
the course of alliances (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010; Yan and Gray, 1994, 2001). High-centrality 
firms that appreciate these benefits of power tend to maintain partnerships with low-centrality 
partners. 
Another benefit of social asymmetry is that it reduces inter-partner competition in 
alliances. Inter-partner competition not only harms harmony and mutual trust but also undermine 
the foundation of long-term partnership (Park and Russo, 1996; Podolny et al., 1996). Partners 
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with similar network centrality are more likely to view each other as potential rivals because they 
might use similar alliance strategies or compete for the same network resources (Chen, 1996; 
Podolny et al., 1996; Sauder, Lynn, and Podolny, 2012). Empirical studies report that the 
combined centrality of partners increases the dissolution likelihood of their alliances (Polidoro et 
al., 2011). The possible reason is that partners that both possess central positions in a network 
would compete against each other for market power and rankings (Jensen, 2008). Socially 
asymmetric partners, on the contrary, might classify themselves to different social niches and in 
turn arouse less competition (Sauder et al., 2012). As such, social asymmetry smoothens partners’ 
relationships and enhance dyadic collaboration.  
 Although enjoying partner compatibility, socially balanced partners with similar network 
centrality are also disadvantaged by such similarity. Alliance partners that both possess high 
centrality face a diminishing return of network centrality, as well as a redundancy in network 
resources (Ahuja et al., 2009). Alliances between two low-centrality partners create little mutual 
benefits in status or prestige. Loosely connected to the network, low-centrality partners have 
insufficient information sources to predict uncertainty and survive environmental discontinuities 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Kogut, 1989), which is one major reason that low-centrality 
firms tend to avoid each other and long for high-centrality partners (Ahuja et al., 2009). In 
general, socially asymmetric partners have mutual benefits in social resources and competition 
reduction that encourage alliance duration, and these benefits will increase with the levels of 










Figure 2: Centrality asymmetry and alliance dissolution (2) 
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3.4 U-shaped effects of social asymmetry on alliance dissolution 
As per the above arguments about the hazards and benefits of social asymmetry, I contend that 
socially asymmetric alliances are disadvantaged by power imbalance and integration difficulties 
while they also enjoy social complementarity and less inter-partner competition. I construct a 
conceptual model to illustrate how social asymmetry exerts dual effects on alliance longevity 
(Figures 1 and 2). The y-axis in each figure is the likelihood of alliance dissolution, and the x-
axis denotes partners’ social asymmetry. Figure 1 depicts two curves that are heading opposite 
directions. Curve 1 depicts the effects that extant research has discussed: as partners’ social 
asymmetry increases, the augmenting power imbalance creates mistrust, opportunism and 
coordination conflicts that push alliances to dissolve. Curve 2 represents the new perspective of 
this study: the increasing mutual benefits and diminishing inter-partner competition reduce 
alliance dissolution. These two curves interact with each other and create a U-shaped curve as 
shown in Figure 2(Haans, Pieters, and He, 2015).   
Table 1 on the following page details the differences between this study and prior 
research in predicting these effects, as well as the underlying reasons. I agree with the prior 
studies on the short longevity of alliance partners with high social asymmetry, while I propose 
my different points of views on the alliance longevity of alliances with moderate and low social 
symmetry. Although low levels of social asymmetry seldom create a power imbalance in the 
alliance, partners would have little complementarity and would engage themselves in the 
competition. As such, the dissolution likelihoods of low-asymmetric alliances are still at a high 
level. As social asymmetry increases to an intermediate level, partners create mutual benefits and 
reduce their competitive tension, and they are still able to put the power imbalance under control 
at this stage. As such, the dissolution likelihoods of intermediate-asymmetric alliances drop to 
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lower levels. Social asymmetry further increasing, the enlarged power imbalance takes over the 
major effects of social asymmetry and eventually tears up the partnership. In general, 
intermediate social asymmetry is associated with lower dissolution likelihoods than low or high 
social asymmetry. I use network centrality to measure partners’ social asymmetry and propose 
the first hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: Alliance partners’ asymmetry in network centrality exerts U-shaped effects on 
the dissolution likelihood of their alliances: intermediate levels of centrality asymmetry lead to 
lower dissolution rates than do high or low asymmetry. 
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complementarity 
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3.5 Internal competition  
As a hybrid form of governance structure that allows partners to retain independence and pursue 
own goals (Williamson, 1991a), the alliance cannot eliminate inter-partner competition. Severe 
inter-partner competition creates a rivalry that harms collaboration and eventually ends dyadic 
partnerships (Das and Teng, 2000a; Park and Ungson, 2001). Partners acting in same industries 
are more likely to engage in such inter-partner competition because they are competing for the 
same audience and substitute for each other. Studies show that incumbent firms prefer to form 
alliances with new entrants with lower social status because they consider the possible 
competition between partners in future (Jensen, 2008). Under this circumstance, socially 
asymmetry spans a safe distance between partners that reduces the direct threat from each other 
(Sauder et al., 2012), leading them to concentrate on collaboration rather than competition. As 
such, the effects of partners’ social asymmetry in reducing inter-partner competition are enlarged 
when partners have an overlap in industries. This change is equivalent to a scenario that Curve 2 
increases its slope in the conceptual model (Figure 1).  
In the meanwhile, partners’ social asymmetry also creates more power imbalance when 
partners are acting in same industries (Podolny et al., 1996). Embedded in the same industrial 
network, one partner’s alliance activities and strategic moves are more relevant to the other. 
Under the circumstance, the industrial network spans a hierarchy of social resources. High-
centrality firms that possess more social resources of the industry are more capable of 
manipulating the network and influencing their low-centrality partners. As such, the power 
imbalance in alliances will be amplified to a greater degree with a given level of social 
asymmetry. For this reason, Curve 1 would change to a greater slope (Figure 1). As both curves 
increase in slope, the U-shape as the interaction of these two curves become steeper (Figure 2). 
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In general, the hazards and benefits of social asymmetry are enlarged such that the total effects 
of social asymmetry on alliance dissolution are exacerbated.   
Hypothesis 2: When partners have overlap in industrial domains, the effects of partners’ 
centrality asymmetry on alliance dissolution are stronger (U-shape becomes steeper).  
3.6 External competition 
Alliances are firms’ important weapons to withstand external competition (Gimeno, 2004; 
Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986), and impose competitive pressure on rivals (Silverman and Baum, 
2002). Confronted by harsh external competition, firms are concerned with the risk of being 
abandoned by partners and the difficulties of fighting alone against strong rivals. Low-centrality 
firms tend to strengthen their current partnerships because they are less capable of finding new 
partners (Baum and Singh, 1994). To maintain the existing social connections, they might 
tolerate more power imbalance and misappropriation in the alliance. High-centrality firms would 
also respond to external competition by enhancing current alliances. Keeping current alliance 
partners also reduces the partnering opportunities of rivals (Gimeno, 2004). As such, the 
competition from the surrounding rivals drives the attention of partners away from the internal 
competition and conflicts. Partners would become less sensitive to the hazards and benefits of 
social asymmetry when external competition becomes more intense. In the conceptual model, 
both Curve 1 and 2 would decrease in slope and make a dampened U-shape (Figure 1 and 2), 
indicating a reduced effect of social asymmetry on alliance dissolution.  
 Hypothesis 3: When partners face intense external competition, the effects of partners’ 
centrality asymmetry on alliance dissolution are weaker (U-shape becomes less steep).  
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3.7 Firm-specific uncertainty 
As alliance partners are useful information sources of market, industry and business environment 
(Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips, 2004; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996), firms’ alliance 
behaviors reflect their strategies to deal with uncertainty. Following the studies that view the 
external uncertainty as a perception of firms rather than a strictly objective state (Dickson and 
Weaver, 1997; Milliken, 1987), I contend that alliance partners’ firm-specific uncertainty are 
relevant to alliance longevity. Firms that face great environmental uncertainty are motivated to 
seek new partners to enhance the diversity of their knowledge pool (Haunschild, 1994). As such, 
the firm-specific uncertainty enlarges the power distance between partners because high-
centrality firms are capable of forming new alliances while low-centrality firms rely on their 
current partners to acquire partnering information and access to third-party partners (Gulati and 
Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, 1993). As firms have always limited managerial capabilities to allocate 
for alliances, high-centrality firms would optimize their alliance portfolio and terminate 
partnerships that contribute less information (Jiang et al., 2010; Wassmer and Dussauge, 2012). 
As a result, Curve 1 that represents the effects of power imbalance increases its slope (Figure 1).  
      On the other hand, great firm-specific uncertainty also encourages firms to appreciate 
their current alliance partners (Uzzi, 1997). The interactions between alliance partners create a 
mutual trust that is critical for partner cohesion and alliance success (Das and Teng, 1998; 
Polidoro et al., 2011). Great firm-specific uncertainty stimulates partners to reduce inter-partner 
competition and strengthen cohesion (Kogut, 1989; McPherson, 1983; Santos and Eisenhardt, 
2009). As such, the positive effects of social asymmetry increase with the same level of 
asymmetry, and Curve 2 that depicts partners’ mutual benefits increase in slope. As both curves 
increase their slope, the U-shape becomes steeper (Figure 2), suggesting that firm-specific 
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uncertainty amplifies both the hazards and benefits of social asymmetry.  
 Hypothesis 4: When partners have great firm-specific uncertainty, the effects of partners’ 






Chapter 4 Research Design and Method 
4.1 Data and sample 
I use Japanese overseas equity alliances (joint ventures) to test the above hypotheses about the 
duration of socially asymmetric alliances. The data of alliances are from Overseas Japanese 
companies (Keizai, 2015), a database developed by Toyo Keizai Inc. This database covers about 
99% of the Japanese public firms that have ever undertaken FDI in foreign countries (Delios and 
Henisz, 2003). These Japanese firms collect the information of their overseas subsidiaries 
(wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint ventures) on an annual basis and document their equity 
alliances from formation to dissolution. I obtain the financial and operational information of the 
Japanese firms from the databank Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (Nikkei, 2015). 
Combining these two databases, I construct a longitudinal sample of equity alliances with both 
joint-venture-level and firm-level information. 
      According to my research design, I take two steps to make the sample. First, I only use 
equity alliances that are formed by two Japanese parent firms (rather than that with a Japanese 
parent and a host-country parent), to reduce the heterogeneity of partners’ cultural difference 
across alliances. Each partner owns 5% to 95% of the equity shares of the alliance. Other 
minority partners (if any) that own less than 5% of the equity shares are taken as portfolio 
investors and not included in the analysis. This step narrows the data to 42,287 observations 
(joint-venture-years). Second, I identify alliances that are formed between two manufacturing 
firms to homogenize further the sample. The final sample has a joint-venture-year structure with 
5,710 observations, in the 1990-2009 period. It contains 693 equity alliances formed between 
486 Japanese firms. These firms form alliances with each other and make 471 unique pairs, with 
some pairs forming more than one equity alliance. These alliances are spread over 39 foreign 
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countries.  
Prior studies suggest partner firms might terminate their collaboration when they reach 
initial goals (Dussauge et al., 2000; Polidoro et al., 2011). I use FDI data to reduce the concerns 
of intended alliance dissolution. Because FDI involves high amounts of capital transfer, political 
risk, cultural difference and the interaction with local authorities (Hymer, 1976), parent firms 
would incur a high sunk cost to retrieve their investment from host countries. Moreover, 
Japanese firms usually make long-term investments in overseas subsidiaries with a significant 
amount of capital, technological and managerial resource. Based on the survey Trend Survey of 
Overseas Business Activities conducted by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
Makino (2007) and his colleagues found that approximately 90% of the termination of Japanese 
international joint ventures were unintended. Hence, I have confidence that the dissolution of 
Japanese overseas equity alliances indicates a business failure or irresolvable conflicts between 
partners, which are unexpected at alliance formation (Berry, 2013; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; 
Kogut, 1989).    
4.2 Variables 
I use a binary variable Alliance dissolution as the dependent variable. It takes the value of 1 
when an equity alliance dissolves, and 0 when it continues. The observations start in 1990 and 
are right-censored in 2009. An alliance dissolution is denoted when a joint venture terminates in 
a year, or one firm takes over its partner’s equity shares and turns the joint venture to a wholly-
owned subsidiary. As the database Overseas Japanese companies tracks down Japanese joint 
ventures in years, the disappearance of a joint venture in this database indicates its termination. I 
code the takeover events using the ownership structure of joint ventures. A takeover is denoted 
when a firm’s equity shares increase to above 95%. The sample contains 243 cases of alliance 
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dissolution (35%) in the observation window, among which 184 cases are joint venture 
termination (76%), and 59 cases are partner takeovers (24%).  
Centrality asymmetry measures social asymmetry between partners. Following other 
studies that measure firms’ differences in resources (Chang and Singh, 1999), I take the absolute 
difference of the normalized eigenvector centrality of two partners to create this variable. I use 
UCINET 6 to calculate the centrality scores of firms before dividing them by 100 to increase the 
scale of their estimated coefficients in regressions. Widely used in social network analysis 
(Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 2013), eigenvector centrality measures the centrality of a focal 
firm by weighing it with the degree centrality of its all linked partners (Bonacich, 1972, 1987). 
This measure assigns a firm with a high centrality score when its partners have high centrality. 
The calculation of eigenvector centrality can be expressed as: 
𝑒𝑖 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑒𝑗
𝑗
 
where ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗  is the degree centrality of the focus node (the firm in this study), which is calculated 
by the total number of a firm’s ties (joint ventures in this study) with others. And 𝑒𝑗  is the 
eigenvector centrality score while 𝜆  is proportionality constant called the eigenvalue. This 
equation defines the centrality of each node as is proportional to the sum of centrality of its 
adjacent nodes, assigning a node with high centrality score when it is connected to nodes 
themselves with high centrality. 
I use the entire dataset of Overseas Japanese Companies that contain 2689 Japanese 
firms to calculate the centrality scores. By so doing, I include all the firms’ alliance partners in 
all industries and measure firms’ centrality in the entire network of overseas Japanese firms. 
Centrality asymmetry is a time-variant variable, as the interfirm network always changes when 
alliances are formed and terminated during 1990-2009. Eigenvector centrality scores can change 
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when a firm maintains the same alliance portfolio because their partners might change their 
centrality scores. The variable centrality asymmetry has a mean of 0.05 and a standard deviation 
of 0.2 while individual firm’s centrality has a mean of 0.05 and a standard deviation of 0.09. It 
shows that compared to the centrality of individual firms, centrality asymmetry between alliance 
partners varies on a greater scale.  
      Centrality asymmetry square is the quadratic term of centrality asymmetry, which is used 
test Hypothesis 1 about the U-curved effects of social asymmetry.  
      Industry overlap is a time-variant variable that is used in Hypothesis 2 to measure inter-
partner competition. I use the number of industries of all of a firm’s subsidiaries (four-digit 
industrial codes) to denote the industrial domains in which the firm is acting. I calculate the ratio 
of partners’ overlapped industries to each firm’s industries and sum the ratios to develop this 
measure. This variable is calculated as Industry overlap = (number of overlapped industries / 
number of industries of firm 1) + (number of overlapped industries / number of industries of firm 
2). As such, the variable Industry overlap has a range of (0, 2]. To measure the attributes of the 
alliance, I arithmetically sum all the characteristic variables of each firm to generate dyad-level 
ones. 
     Density is the log of all Japanese subsidiaries in a host country, including joint ventures 
and wholly-owned subsidiaries. Used to test Hypothesis 3, this time-variant variable measures 
the external competition that alliance partners commonly face in a host country (Lu and Ma, 
2008). High density indicates harsh external competition.  
     Local experience sum measures partners’ host country experience and is used to test 
Hypothesis 4. I calculate the local experience of a firm by the sum of all of a firm’s subsidiaries 
(joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries) multiplied by subsidiary age. Two firms’ scores 
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of local experience are logarithm-transformed and summed to one score. Multinational 
enterprises can use their foreign subsidiaries to collect information in host countries (Makino and 
Delios, 1996). Firms’ host country ( local ) experience yields substantive information about the 
culture, policy change and market conditions of the host country (Barkema, Bell, and Pennings, 
1996; Chang, 1995). As such, I use local experience sum to measure the firm-specific 
uncertainty of the partners (Foss and Pedersen, 2002). Local experience sum is a monotonic 
decreasing function of Local experience sum: partners with more local experience have less firm-
specific uncertainty.  
        I include three sets of variables to control for other factors that affect alliance dissolution. 
The first set of control variables capture partners’ prior alliance relationships and current social 
connections that affect their partnering preferences. Studies show that two partners’ historical 
ties could affect their cooperation in future (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Kogut, 1989; Park and 
Russo, 1996; Park and Ungson, 1997) although this effect might not last long (Soda, Usai, and 
Zaheer, 2004). Prior Ties, the number of joint ventures the partners have ever formed in previous 
years captures these relational effects. The Japanese economy is featured by the unique business 
system Keiretsu--the groups of firms that are linked by interlocked ownership and supply chain 
relationships. Partners in the same business group have profound and strong social relationships 
that affect their alliance activities (Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi, 1992). I put on a binary 
variable Same Business Group to denote this relationship. This variable takes the value 1 if the 
two firms are affiliated to the same Keiretsu, and 0 otherwise. As the social status of a firm can 
affect its volatility in partnering (Ahuja et al., 2009; Podolny, 1993), I control for the partners’ 
combined status with the binary variable Nikkei 225 dyad. It takes 1 if both firms are included in 
the components of Nikkei 225 index, or 0 otherwise. Nikkei 225 index is the stock market 
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indicator of Tokyo Stock Exchange (Nikkei, 2014). Firms included to calculate this index are 
representative ones in their industrial domains. 
      The second set of control variables capture the characteristics of the dyads. Size Sum 
measures the size of a dyad, which is calculated as the sum of the log of two firms’ total capital. 
This variable is to control for the size effect: larger firms can locate more managerial resources 
for alliances (Gulati, 1995). As firm performance can affect firms’ decision to divest overseas 
investments (Berry, 2010), I include ROA Sum, the sum of the two firms’ return on asset. R&D 
Sum is the sum of two firms’ R&D intensity ratio, the expenses on R&D to the total sales. It 
measures the technological capabilities of the dyad that affect the survival of subsidiaries in 
foreign countries (Zhang et al., 2007). To control for the ownership structure of the equity 
alliances that affect collaboration stability, I generate the variable Ownership Inequality, the 
standard deviation of partners’ equity shares in their joint ventures (Park & Russo, 1996).  
      The third set of control variables denote the survival capabilities of the equity alliances. 
Joint Venture Size is the log of the total employees (Evans, 1987). Joint Venture Age is the 
yearly age of the joint venture. The performance of an overseas subsidiary is a major factor that 
determines parent firm’s decision to divest it (Berry, 2013). As the data contains no financial 
performance of subsidiaries, I use a substitute Joint Venture Performance, which is a binary 
variable that denotes whether the joint venture has above-average performance among the peers 
in the same industry. It takes 1 if the joint venture’s sales growth ratio exceeds that of the 
industrial mean (four-digit industrial codes), and 0 otherwise.  
      Moreover, I use host country fixed effects and industry fixed effects (two-digit industrial 
codes) by adding dummies in regressions. I generate a variable, Autoregression Term, to control 
for endogeneity issue. This variable is the lagged mean of two firms’ values of Alliance 
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dissolution in their all other alliance relationships except the current one (Lincoln, 1984; Stuart, 
1998; Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014). Suppose firm i and j have an equity alliance at time t. If 
firm i has alliances with firm j, h, and g at the same time, while firm j has alliances with firm i 
and k as well. Then, 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = (dissolution𝑖ℎ,𝑡−1 + dissolution𝑖𝑔,𝑡−1 +
dissolution𝑗𝑘,𝑡−1)/3. The range of Autoregression term is [0,1]. Table 2 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the sample and inter-correlation of all the main variables. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and inter-correlation of main variables 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Alliance dissolution 1.00 
               2 Centrality asymmetry 0.04 1.00
              3 Industry overlap 0.01 -0.10 1.00
             4 Density 0.00 0.05 0.01 1.00
            5 Local experience sum 0.03 0.13 -0.15 0.42 1.00
           6 Autoregression term 0.15 0.16 -0.05 0.00 0.08 1.00
          7 Prior ties -0.03 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.19 -0.01 1.00
         8 Same business group 0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.03 1.00
        9 Nikkei225 dyad 0.04 -0.01 -0.10 -0.13 0.17 0.02 -0.08 0.18 1.00
       10 Size sum -0.02 0.18 -0.08 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.16 -0.01 -0.01 1.00
      11 ROA sum -0.02 -0.12 -0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.07 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.17 1.00
     12 R&D sum -0.01 0.17 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.16 0.14 1.00
    13 Ownership Inequality 0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.09 0.08 0.03 -0.09 0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
   14 Joint venture size -0.07 0.15 -0.15 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.30 0.08 0.11 0.07 1.00
  15 Joint venture age 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.10 0.41 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07 0.14 1.00
 16 Joint venture performance -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.18 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.06 1.00
 Mean 0.04 0.05 1.12 6.34 6.80 0.05 3.40 0.04 0.11 14.94 0.07 0.05 0.18 4.98 11.24 0.29 
 Standard Deviation 0.20 0.20 0.34 1.12 1.98 0.06 4.50 0.21 0.31 0.78 0.07 0.03 0.15 1.73 8.37 0.45 
 Min 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.69 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 12.83 -0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
 Max 1.00 1.40 2.00 7.86 13.92 1.00 25.00 1.00 1.00 16.27 0.32 0.37 0.50 9.50 75.00 1.00 
n=5710; Correlation >0.02or <-0.02 are significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed test) 
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4.3 Analytic models and endogeneity issue  
I do discrete time survival analysis on the dissolution of Japanese overseas alliances, and fit the 
dependent variable alliance dissolution in pooled Probit models. The results are robust to model 
choice: Logistic model and Cox hazard model (continuous survival analysis) yield similar 
estimates. 
     I use several methods to reduce possible endogeneity bias in the statistical analysis. My 
first concern is the reverse causality that alliance dissolution also causes centrality asymmetry 
because a firm that loses ties could change its network centrality. I take three steps to reduce this 
possible bias. First, I lag the dependent variable for one year to allow for time effects. Second, I 
measure firms’ centrality with the entire Japanese interfirm network in Overseas Japanese 
companies, while I examine only the alliances between two manufacturing firms. By so doing, I 
obtain a centrality score that reflects a firm’s social relationships in all industries, not its network 
in manufacturing sectors. Third, I use the independent variable centrality asymmetry as an 
absolute difference of two centrality scores. Because both firms’ centrality scores will decrease 
when their alliance dissolves, the change in the absolute difference is small. This measure allows 
us to reduce the concurrence of the reduction in centrality asymmetry and alliance dissolution. 
     It is possible that the correlations between dyads in the dependent variable that can cause 
estimation bias. Because some firms form alliances with multiple partners, their preference in 
alliance dissolution could influence more than one alliance. This issue of inter-dyad correlations 
is known as the non-independence problem in prior studies (Lincoln, 1984). Following the 
methods of precedent studies (Lincoln, 1984; Stuart, 1998; Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014), I 
generate an autoregressive variable, Autoregression term, in terms of Alliance dissolution and 
put it on the right-hand side of regression models to reduce this possible bias. The calculation of 
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this variable is stated in the variable section of this paper. Autoregression term also captures the 
unobservable effects in the model and adjust model misspecification.  
Moreover, I use another post-estimation remedy, multiway cluster-robust standard errors, 
to minimize the effects of “non-independence problem”, as well as the heteroskedasticity across 
alliances. The Stata ado package clus_nway that could be implanted in Probit regressions allows 
us to cluster the observations by firm, dyad and joint venture at the same time (Cameron, 
Gelbach, and Miller, 2011; Kleinbaum, Stuart, and Tushman, 2013). This method adjusts the 
standard errors in the post-estimation stage and checks the robustness of estimation results. 
Furthermore, I use some control variables to account for the endogenous process of network 
dynamics (Ahuja et al., 2012; Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). Prior ties captures the historical 
relationships between partners. Joint venture age that carries the previous survival information of 
equity alliances adjusts the left-censoring problem in survival analysis. The description of these 








Chapter 5 Results 
5.1 Regression results 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample and the inter-item correlations of all main 
variables. The correlations between variables are at low levels, with 0.42 between density and 
local experience sum as the largest score. It suggests low levels of multicollinearity among 
explanatory variables. The dependent variable alliance dissolution has a mean of 0.04 and 
standard deviation of 0.2, showing that the dissolution rates of Japanese equity alliances are low 
while the variance of dissolution is relatively large. To better understand the data, I run Probit 
regressions and plot the fitted values of alliance dissolution against centrality asymmetry. As 
Figure 3 shows, a large proportion of observations have small scores of centrality asymmetry, 
indicating that many dyads have low centrality asymmetry. However, there are still an amount of 
observations have higher levels of centrality asymmetry. In the figure, I see that the scatters of 
predicted dissolution rates can fit with a U-shaped curve: intermediate levels of centrality 
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Autoregression term 3.77*** 3.60*** 3.60*** 3.60*** 3.55*** 3.57*** 3.55*** 
 (6.57) (6.32) (6.35) (6.34) (6.26) (6.29) (6.24) 
Prior ties -0.03* -0.03* -0.02+ -0.02+ -0.02+ -0.02+ -0.02+ 
 (-2.02) (-2.04) (-1.81) (-1.78) (-1.83) (-1.92) (-1.76) 
Same business group 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 
 (0.27) (0.16) (0.35) (0.34) (0.25) (0.29) (0.24) 
Nikkei225 dyad 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 
 (0.52) (0.65) (0.59) (0.61) (0.76) (0.63) (0.70) 
Size sum 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.14) (-0.01) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
ROA sum -0.52 -0.35 -0.64 -0.64 -0.65 -0.66 -0.63 
 (-1.04) (-0.66) (-1.19) (-1.19) (-1.20) (-1.23) (-1.18) 
R&D sum 0.06 -0.19 -0.29 -0.28 -0.26 -0.23 -0.26 
 (0.06) (-0.17) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.24) (-0.21) (-0.23) 
Ownership Inequality 0.50* 0.65** 0.67** 0.67** 0.67** 0.67** 0.67** 
 (2.03) (2.75) (2.88) (2.88) (2.87) (2.88) (2.86) 
Joint venture size -0.06* -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
 (-2.53) (-3.57) (-3.59) (-3.61) (-3.57) (-3.56) (-3.58) 
Joint venture age 0.01 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 
 (1.60) (2.29) (2.20) (2.17) (2.14) (2.14) (2.12) 
Joint venture performance -0.17* -0.15* -0.14+ -0.14+ -0.13+ -0.14+ -0.13+ 
 (-2.42) (-2.13) (-1.91) (-1.89) (-1.85) (-1.87) (-1.83) 
Industry overlap -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 
 (-0.49) (-0.36) (-0.71) (-0.54) (-0.71) (-0.82) (-0.59) 
Density 0.42+ 0.37 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 
 (1.93) (1.61) (1.27) (1.28) (1.32) (1.26) (1.32) 
Local experience sum 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (1.03) (0.62) (0.91) (0.94) (0.84) (0.57) (0.65) 
Centrality asymmetry  0.34*** -3.06*** -1.53 -19.46** -8.91** -18.36** 
  (3.53) (-3.75) (-0.38) (-3.27) (-2.79) (-2.90) 
Centrality asymmetry square   2.74*** 1.30 16.71*** 7.70** 15.66** 
   (4.31) (0.41) (3.71) (3.03) (3.08) 
Centrality asymmetry 
×industry overlap 
   
-1.46   -1.36 
    (-0.34)   (-0.33) 
Centrality asymmetry square 
× industry overlap 
   
1.36   1.16 
    (0.40)   (0.36) 
Centrality asymmetry × 
density 
    
2.44**  2.26* 
     (2.89)  (2.27) 
Centrality asymmetry square 
× density 
    
-2.07**  -1.98** 
     (-3.25)  (-2.58) 
Centrality asymmetry × local 
experience sum 
     
0.71* 0.19 
      (1.96) (0.42) 
Centrality asymmetry square 
× local experience sum 
     
-0.60* -0.10 
      (-2.15) (-0.28) 
Constant term -3.06** -2.61* -2.33* -2.35* -2.30* -2.24* -2.29* 
 (-2.86) (-2.42) (-2.15) (-2.12) (-2.13) (-2.06) (-2.07) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -911.03 -889.38 -882.79 -882.71 -879.09 -881.69 -878.90 
Chi-squares 196.97 199.76 212.93 213.09 220.34 215.15 220.72 
       N=5710; Dependent variable: alliance dissolution; 
      Estimation models are pooled Probit models;   
       z statistics in parentheses; two-tailed tests, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001;  




The main results of discrete time survival analysis fitted in pooled Probit models are 
stated in Table 3. I use Stata 13 to run the regressions and estimate every model with country 
fixed effects and industry fixed effects (using the two-digit industrial codes of the joint venture) 
by adding country and industry dummies. All the results are adjusted for multiway cluster-robust 
standard errors. I report the coefficients of estimates instead of hazard ratios for easy 
interpretation: a positive estimated coefficient means that the focal explanatory variable 
accelerates alliance dissolution while a negative sign indicates the effects of reducing dissolution.  
The large scores of Chi-squares of each regression justify the model specifications. 
Model 1 in the first column is a baseline regression including all the independent and control 
variables except centrality asymmetry. Most of the variables have the expected signs that are 
consistent with extant research. The key independent variable centrality asymmetry enters Model 
2 and obtains a positively significant estimate (p<0.001), indicating that partners’ centrality 
asymmetry increases alliance dissolution in general. These results are similar to the findings of 
prior studies that suggest the negative effects of centrality asymmetry (Polidoro et al., 2011).  
Model 3 tests Hypothesis 1 that says centrality asymmetry exerts U-curved effects on 
alliance dissolution. The variable centrality asymmetry square enters Model 3 and obtains a 
positively significant estimate. The estimate of centrality asymmetry turns to be negative. Both 
variables being significant at 0.001 level indicates a U-curved relationship between centrality 
asymmetry and alliance dissolution. I do a nested model test using the likelihood ratio of Model 
2 and Model 3. The result shows that Model 3 substantially improves the model fitting of Model 
2, indicating that Model 3 with the quadratic term of centrality asymmetry adds to explaining the 
variance in the dependent variable. It means that a nonmonotonic model can fit the dependent 
variable better than a linear model. I also do a formal statistical test with Stata command utest on 
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centrality asymmetry and confirm the existence of a U-shaped curve (Lind and Mehlum, 2007, 
2010). In general, I get strong empirical support to Hypothesis 1: intermediate levels of centrality 
asymmetry lead to lower dissolution rates than low or high asymmetry.  
     Model 4 tests Hypothesis 2 that predicts stronger effects of centrality asymmetry when 
partners have overlap in industries. I put on the interaction terms centrality asymmetry× industry 
overlap and centrality asymmetry square × industry overlap one by one in the regressions. 
Neither of them obtains a significant estimate while the estimates of centrality asymmetry square 
and centrality asymmetry remain statistically unchanged. As such, I do not report these results in 
Table 3. I include the two interaction terms together in Model 4. The estimates of these 
interaction terms are non-significant while the variables centrality asymmetry square and 
centrality asymmetry also lose significance. These results provide no support to Hypothesis 2.   
     Model 5 tests Hypothesis 3 that the effects of centrality asymmetry are weaker when 
partners face harsh external competition, with the variable density as a proxy for external 
competition. I first run regressions by adding the interaction term centrality asymmetry× density 
and centrality asymmetry square × density alone respectively. The estimates are non-significant, 
and I do not report these results in Table 3. The two interaction terms enter Model 5 together and 
obtain significant estimates. Centrality asymmetry square × density has a negative estimate 
coefficient, and centrality asymmetry× density is positively significant. I do a nested model test 
on Model 5 and Model 3 using the likelihood ratio of each model. Results show that Model 5 
substantially improves the fitting of Model 3. In conclusion, density reduces the U-curved effects 
of centrality asymmetry. The results support Hypothesis 3 that the effects of centrality 
asymmetry are dampened as external competition becomes intense.  
Model 6 tests Hypothesis 4 that the effects of centrality asymmetry are enlarged when 
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partners have greater firm-specific uncertainty. I get no significant estimate for centrality 
asymmetry× local experience sum and centrality asymmetry square × local experience sum 
when regressing on them one by one. I do not report these results in Table 3. These two 
interaction terms enter the regression together in Model 6. Centrality asymmetry square × local 
experience sum gains a negative sign and centrality asymmetry × local experience sum is 
positive. It means that partners’ host country experience reduces the effects of centrality 
asymmetry. As firm-specific uncertainty is a monotonic decreasing function of host country 
experience, the result supports Hypothesis 4 about the positive moderating effects of partners’ 
firm-specific uncertainty. However, a nested model test on Model 6 and Model 3 using their 
likelihood ratios shows that Model 6 has minimal improvement to Model 3. It means the 
moderating effects of firm-specific uncertainty receive no statistical confirmation. The two 
interaction terms’ passing individual statistical tests (z-tests) with a significant level of 0.05 is 
due to the use of multiway cluster-robust standard errors, which adjusts the conventional 
standard errors to smaller ones in this case. Although the results have not provided strong 
support to Hypothesis 4, the large scores of z-statistics still give us a suggestive sign that a large 
sample size might yield significant results.  
The last column of Table 3 is Model 7 that contains all the explanatory variables in 
previous models. Most of the variables remain the similar significant estimates expect centrality 
asymmetry× local experience sum and centrality asymmetry square × local experience sum.  
      In conclusion, the survival analysis of the Japanese overseas equity alliances provides 
strong evidence that supports the hypotheses, especially Hypothesis 1 and 3. The results show 
the U-curved effects of centrality asymmetry on alliance dissolution. The effects of centrality 
asymmetry are reduced as external competition increases. I have not found any empirical result 
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to support Hypothesis 2 about the moderating effects of inter-partner competition. I obtain only 
suggestive results for Hypothesis 4 about the amplifying effects of firm-specific uncertainty. 
5.2 Robustness check 
I do additional analysis to check whether the U-curved effects of centrality asymmetry vary 
across alliance types. Table 4 lists the results of the robustness check regressions. Using the 
database Overseas Japanese companies, I code two binary variables vertical alliance and 
exploration alliance to denote alliance types. Vertical alliance takes the value 1 if the equity 
alliance only has vertical missions such as information collection, funding or marketing, and it 
takes 0 otherwise (Phene and Tallman, 2012). Exploration alliance takes the value 1 if the 
alliance only has exploration missions such as R&D or expansion to new business, and it takes 0 
otherwise (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Both of them are time-variant variables because 
Japanese equity alliances are possible to change their missions. Using these two variables, I split 
the sample into different sub-samples and do survival analysis on them. Model 8 and Model 9 
contain the groups “vertical alliance” and “non-vertical alliance” respectively. Model 10 and 
Model 11 contain the groups “exploration alliances” and “non-exploration alliances”.  
      Centrality asymmetry and centrality asymmetry square are non-significant in Model 8 
(vertical alliances) while they are significant in Model 9 (non-vertical alliances) with similar 
estimates as in Model 3. As the z-statistics in Model 8 are quite large and close to the critical 
value of 0.05-level significance, I cannot conclude that the effects of centrality asymmetry would 
disappear in vertical alliances. It is reasonable to expect significant results of the effects in larger 
samples. Centrality asymmetry and Centrality asymmetry square are non-significant at 0.05 level 
in Model 10 (exploration alliances) while they obtain significant estimates in Model 11 (non-
exploration alliances). Likewise, I ascribe this non-significance in Model 10 to the small sample 
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size of the group “exploration alliances”. I cannot conclude that the effects are weaker in 
exploration alliances. In conclusion, the results show that the U-shaped effects of centrality 
asymmetry exist in different types of alliances.    
      I use a different measure of inter-partner to test Hypothesis 2 again. Using Nikkei 
Economic Electronic Databank System, I split the sample into two groups of observations by 
firms’ major industrial classification. Model 12 contains the observations with partners acting in 
the same industry, and Model 13 contains the alliances with partners acting in different industries. 
Centrality asymmetry and Centrality asymmetry square are significant in both models, with the 
estimates that are similar to that in Model 3. These results show that the U-curved effects of 
centrality asymmetry exist in both alliance groups and that partners’ overlap in the industry does 
not moderate the effects of centrality asymmetry. In conclusion, I find no empirical evidence to 
support Hypothesis 2.     
As a conclusion of the empirical tests, the survival analysis on overseas Japanese equity 
alliances provides strong evidence that supports Hypothesis 1 and 3. I confirm a U-shaped 
relationship between partners’ centrality asymmetry and the dissolution likelihood of their 
alliances. Results of robustness check show the U-shaped effects of social asymmetry could exist 
across alliance types, i.e., vertical and non-vertical, exploration and non-exploration alliances. 
Moreover, the effects of social asymmetry are reduced when alliance partners face intense 
external competition. I find some suggestive evidence that these effects are enlarged by partners’ 
firm-specific uncertainty. However, I find no evidence that these effects will be enlarged when 
partners have an overlap in industrial domains. The possible reason is that partners acting in the 
same industries have strong complementarities and mutual forbearance that could offset the 
effects of inter-partner competition.   
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Table 4: Robustness check regressions 




















Autoregression term 5.28*** 3.41*** 2.70** 4.06*** 3.33*** 4.22*** 
 (4.81) (5.46) (2.91) (6.99) (5.63) (4.33) 
Prior ties 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.04** -0.01 -0.03+ 
 (0.46) (-1.62) (1.25) (-2.95) (-0.65) (-1.69) 
Same business group 0.31 0.02 -0.12 0.05 -0.38 0.16 
 (0.61) (0.14) (-0.21) (0.30) (-1.15) (0.95) 
Nikkei225 dyad -0.12 0.13 0.22 0.07 -0.01 0.02 
 (-0.34) (1.08) (0.57) (0.64) (-0.08) (0.14) 
Size sum 0.22 -0.00 0.06 -0.00 0.10 -0.22* 
 (1.26) (-0.02) (0.33) (-0.01) (1.46) (-2.43) 
ROA sum -1.64 -0.42 0.07 -0.80 -1.42* 0.91 
 (-1.38) (-0.68) (0.05) (-1.37) (-2.20) (0.98) 
R&D sum 0.33 -1.07 3.46 -0.79 0.54 -0.97 
 (0.08) (-0.89) (1.05) (-0.68) (0.38) (-0.56) 
Ownership Inequality 2.33*** 0.67** 1.78*** 0.55* 0.43 1.15** 
 (3.47) (2.78) (3.36) (2.26) (1.38) (3.14) 
Joint venture size -0.13 -0.09*** -0.17* -0.08** -0.07* -0.11** 
 (-1.53) (-3.43) (-2.07) (-2.92) (-1.99) (-2.66) 
Joint venture age 0.01 0.01+ 0.03** 0.01 0.01+ 0.01 
 (0.94) (1.82) (2.67) (1.61) (1.79) (1.52) 
Joint venture performance -0.09 -0.16+ 0.11 -0.20* -0.09 -0.19 
 (-0.47) (-1.87) (0.57) (-2.45) (-0.81) (-1.49) 
Industry overlap -0.03 -0.08 -0.57* 0.05 -0.07 0.15 
 (-0.10) (-0.68) (-2.33) (0.44) (-0.42) (1.05) 
Density 1.41* 0.16 0.28 0.33 0.52 0.07 
 (2.13) (0.75) (0.45) (1.45) (1.37) (0.35) 
Local experience sum -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
 (-0.36) (0.72) (-0.33) (0.94) (0.72) (1.08) 
Centrality asymmetry -4.73 -2.81** -3.04 -2.74** -2.95* -3.21* 
 (-1.54) (-2.94) (-1.48) (-2.74) (-1.99) (-1.99) 
Centrality asymmetry 
square 3.99 2.58*** 2.64+ 2.46** 2.55* 2.80* 
 (1.55) (3.36) (1.78) (3.18) (2.10) (2.25) 
Constant term -9.92* -5.35*** -0.96 -2.63* -4.50* -2.79 
 (-2.56) (-4.67) (-0.30) (-2.15) (-2.47) (-1.59) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -136.26 -720.04 -148.9 -708.26 -466.59 -384.31 
Chi-squares 88.42 166.57 66.96 191.99 138.28 127.47 
Observation number 936 4732 1046 4605 3237 2368 
All models are discrete time analyses fitting with pooled Probit model 
Dependent variable: alliance dissolution;   
z statistics in parentheses; two-tailed tests, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001;  
Robust Standard Error Estimations clustered by firm, dyad and joint venture. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Discussion  
I use this study to investigate the influences of alliance partners’ social asymmetry on the 
longevity of their equity alliances. I am motivated to examine this research question because 
prior studies seem to be dominated by a perspective that asymmetry leads to alliance instability 
while its potential benefits are insufficiently considered. The previous studies that study the 
relationships between centrality asymmetry and alliance duration have emphasized the hazards of 
asymmetry while ignoring its benefits. The conclusion that centrality asymmetry has a positive linear 
relationship with alliance dissolution is solely based on the notion of the hazard of asymmetry 
(Polidoro et al., 2011). Although I agree with the received wisdom about the negative 
consequences of social asymmetry in pushing alliances to dissolve, I contend that a complete 
view should include its creating complementarity and reducing inter-partner competition that 
encourages alliance duration. My study recognizes the hazards and benefits of social asymmetry 
and proposes a U-shaped relationship. In that sense, my study provides a complete view of the 
overall effects of social asymmetry. Considering these negative and positive effects together, I 
propose that a moderate level of social asymmetry is beneficial to alliance longevity. The 
survival analysis of overseas Japanese equity alliances come to expected results that intermediate 
social asymmetry leads to lower levels of dissolution likelihoods as compared to low or high 
asymmetry alliances. I also test these effects in different alliance types and explore the 
contingencies that when partners have internal and external competition and firm-specific 
uncertainty.  
  This research speaks to the recent research stream that examines partners’ asymmetric 
interdependence in dyadic collaboration (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Gulati and Sytch, 2007). 
My contribution is to advocate a balanced view of the relationships between alliance partners’ 
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social asymmetry and power. Prior studies usually emphasize the hazards of partner asymmetry 
in creating power imbalance and view the firm with fewer social resources as the dependent 
party in a dyad. With that perspective, prior research suggests that the power construct in socially 
asymmetric alliances resembles the power construct of a network: high-centrality firms have 
power over low-centrality firms and the levels of power imbalance are proportional to the 
amount of centrality asymmetry (Ma et al., 2012; Polidoro et al., 2011). This theory, however, 
could not explain the phenomenon that some alliances with low levels of social asymmetry 
would dissolve while some others with high asymmetry continue to exist. I contend that partners’ 
dyadic relationships are distinct from their relationships of connecting to the same network 
because partners have more interdependencies in a dyad. As partners’ social asymmetry has dual 
effects that separate partner and enhance partner cohesion, a balanced perspective should come 
to a proposition that power construct in an alliance has a nonlinear relationship with social 
asymmetry. Holding this perspective, I interpret the heterogeneity of centrality asymmetry across 
alliances as the result of the interplay of the two opposite forces of social asymmetry and contend 
that the longevity of an alliance depends on partners’ efforts in balancing its hazards and benefits. 
This study has several implications for research on firms’ alliance behaviors in their 
network embeddedness. First, this study on alliance dissolution complements extant research 
about the impact of social context on dyadic relationships (Gulati, 1998; Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999; Polidoro et al., 2011). Prior studies have shown that firms’ social embeddedness facilitates 
their partner seeking and alliance formation. I go further to find that network structure also 
affects firms’ decisions to terminate alliances. As alliance formation and dissolution are the 
elements of network evolution, this study provides new evidence to support the perspective that 
the dynamics of network structure are an endogenous process: the network positions of firms per 
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se guides them to move to new positions of the network (Ahuja et al., 2009; Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999).  
Second, this study answers a fundamental question about firms’ partnering behaviors: 
whether social similarity or dissimilarity drives firms to form and terminate alliances (Ahuja et 
al., 2009; Chung et al., 2000). My research suggests that neither the homophily view nor the 
complementary perspective alone is sufficient to explain firms’ partnering patterns. The 
prevalent view of structural homophily has good explanatory power in alliance formation, such 
as the point that high-centrality firms tend to ally with one another (Kleinbaum et al., 2013; 
Podolny, 1994), and that alliances between central and peripheral firms are short-lived (Polidoro 
et al., 2011). However, the structural homophily view neither explains the phenomena that the 
alliances between two low-centrality firms are rare (Ahuja et al., 2009), nor provides reasons for 
the empirical findings that the alliances formed by two high-centrality firms are nondurable 
(Polidoro et al., 2011). The complementary perspective views dissimilarity and resource match 
as firms’ main drivers in alliance activities (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). This 
perspective can explain well the formation of alliances between complementary partners while it 
does not tap into the theories that suggest partner similarity and compatibility enhance alliance 
duration (Chung et al., 2000). This study shows that firms consider the social similarities that 
create the benefits of compatibility while they also appreciate the social asymmetry that brings 
potential complementarity. As such, future studies should combine perspectives to interpreting 
firms’ partnering patterns when considering their social similarity and asymmetry. 
Third, I infer some principles of network structure and dynamics with the findings of 
firms’ alliance behaviors. Although network theory stresses the advantages of high centrality in 
information and social status, recent research has started to examine whether high-centrality 
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firms are persistently advantageous in locating and attracting partners (Ahuja et al., 2009). Given 
the finding that centrality-similar alliances are not as durable as the ones with moderate centrality, 
I contend that network dynamics are not purely a process of the Matthew’s Effect in which 
central firms always become more central with their attractiveness in network resources. Harsh 
inter-partner competition and network resource redundancy will direct central firms away from 
other central ones. To maintain their central positions, they need to consider partners with low 
centrality. Hence, peripheral firms are not always limited to expand their networks because they 
have opportunities to form alliances with central firms and thereby move closer to central 
positions.  
As for firms’ alliance strategy, prior studies usually focus on the strategies and 
performance of high-centrality firms, leaving the network strategies of low-centrality firms 
insufficiently researched (Ahuja et al., 2009). This study questions the traditional perspective 
that low-centrality firms, as the weak party in dyads, have to make up their dependence by 
offering competitive capabilities or making sacrifices in value splitting (Alvarez and Barney, 
2001; Castellucci and Ertug, 2010; Kale and Singh, 2007). According to my theory that social 
asymmetry per se does not necessarily lead to the asymmetric interdependence between alliance 
partners, low-centrality firms can manipulate their social value to gain power in a dyad. 
Specifically, low-centrality firms can choose the partners of moderately higher (rather than very 
high) centrality to yield long partnerships. As external competition increases, low-centrality 
firms can enhance cohesion with high-centrality partners. They can also expect durable 
partnerships when partners lack experience in a new environment and face great firm-specific 
uncertainty.   
I see great potential to continue with this line of research on the interfirm relationships in 
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alliances. As this study mainly deals with the dyadic relationships in alliances, future research 
could focus on triads or multiply-partner alliances that involve complicated partner interaction. 
In this study, I test the general effects of centrality asymmetry throughout the course of an 
alliance. It is interesting to bring in the time dimension to see how these effects vary across 
alliance stages, and what strategies firms can use to cope with them. I am also interested in 
exploring more about firms’ strategies to reduce the hazards of social asymmetry and enhance 
the benefits when social asymmetry is extremely high or low. Furthermore, it is worth studying 
how asymmetries between partners in other resources could interact with their social asymmetry, 
and how firms strategize around different asymmetries to keep a balance of power. 
Due to data limitation, this empirical tests of this study has not directly addressed the 
scenario that firms could form alliances with each other based on their considerations on social 
asymmetry. This lack of information of alliance formation makes it difficult to control for the 
possible selection bias that firms form alliances with specific partners with a certain degree of 
social asymmetry in the first place. Although I have applied multiple methodological techniques 
to reduce this possible bias, such as autoregression term, and multiple clustering etc., some 
scholars might still be concerned with this possible selection bias.  
In this study, I use joint ventures as equity alliances to represent interfirm alliances. 
These equity alliances are different from other types of alliances, such as R&D alliances and the 
strategic alliances that involve unique cooperation and collusion. However, available data of 
Japanese firms’ overseas investment only provides the joint ventures as observable alliances. On 
the other hand, joint ventures are also appropriate settings for this study because they have clear 
definition and provide information on the dissolution of alliances. Future studies that include 
more data could also explore more in this aspects and test the theories of this study on other 
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types of alliances. Moreover, this study looks at the joint ventures that are located in overseas 
markets. Overseas investment involves some issues such as cultural difference (Park and Ungson, 
1997), the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), as well as policy uncertainty in some 
developing countries. Whether the relationships between alliance partners is by nature the same 
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Firms’ Strategies in Asymmetric Alliances 
 
This study investigates Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises’ (SMEs) strategies to exploit the 
value of their alliances with large and resourceful firms in their internationalization. Prior 
research that focuses on the competition between alliance partners has suggested strategies for 
SMEs to protect themselves from misappropriation. This study stresses on partner cooperation 
and examines SMEs’ post-formation strategies to exploit the value of asymmetric alliances with 
their weak power and constrained capabilities. The analysis of Japanese small- and medium-
sized trading companies (SMTCs) shows that they could use their alliances with Keiretsu-
affiliated trading companies (Sogo Shosha) to speed up international expansion, especially 
partners have dissimilar portfolios of host countries. These benefits of the alliances with Sogo 
Shosha diminish when those SMTCs become more embedded in these dyadic relationships, or 
they form alliances with multiple Sogo Shosha.    
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Chapter 7 Introduction 
Firms can use alliances to access to external resources that complement own capabilities. Small- 
and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) that are relatively limited in internal resources can use 
their social connections to obtain resources that are critical for their survival and growth 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati, 1998). In their choosing alliance partners, SMEs 
might prefer the firms with huge size and abundant resources because the alliances with those 
giant firms not only supplement SMEs’ resource shortage but also enhance their visibility in the 
network (Podolny, 1993; Stuart, 2000). However, the alliances with large and resourceful firms 
will not necessarily lead to success. SMEs might lack capabilities to absorb the competitive 
advantages of their large partners (Alvarez and Barney, 2001) while they face the risk of value 
misappropriation, technology leakage and other misbehavior due to the power imbalance 
between partners (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Katila et al., 2008). As such, SMEs still need 
strategies to protect their interest and explore more values from their alliances with large and 
resourceful partners.  
Prior studies that are aware of SMEs’ weakness in resources have suggested protection 
strategies to resist misappropriation, such as choosing suitable partners, using patent or secrecy 
to prevent knowledge leakage, or choosing alliance types to avoid hazards (Diestre and 
Rajagopalan, 2012; Katila et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2014). Although the idea of protection 
strategy aims at reducing SMEs’ risk of losing competitive advantages, it contradicts the nature 
of such asymmetric alliances where SMEs are more dependent on their partners. Large and 
resourceful firms would form alliances with SMEs because such partnership poses few inter-
partner competitive pressure to themselves while they can apply power to obtain valuable 
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resources from their weak partners (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Zollo et al., 2002). SMEs have 
difficulties to compete with their large partners on value splitting, and they face critical tasks to 
prevent knowledge leakage and protect their competitive capabilities. Moreover, the idea of 
protection strategy emphasizes the competition between partners. SMEs’ using protection 
strategy would create frictions and rivalry in the partnerships of alliances.   
Since the alliance is an interfirm cooperation, enhancing mutual trust and collaboration 
can be SMEs’ strategies to obtain values from alliances. SMEs could advocate resource 
exchange between partners and view the alliance as a cooperation rather than a platform for 
interpartner competition. Dissimilar network resources of partners could potentially create 
complementarity (Gulati, 1998; Lavie, 2007). SMEs can exchange their unique value for desired 
resources with their large and resourceful partners. The literature shows that mutual trust is 
critical to partner cohesion in alliances (Das and Teng, 1998; Das and Teng, 2000a). If small 
firms could manage to gain trust from their large partners, they might expect closer partnerships 
(Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Moreover, the coordination between partners in strategies enhance 
the competitive capabilities of both firms (Gimeno, 2004). SMEs can also use exclusivity 
strategy that they only ally with one large partner to show their loyalty and trust. In general, the 
strategies that avoid sharp contest can be useful strategies for SMEs to obtain resource 
commitment from their large partners.  
Prior studies mainly focus on the strategies SMEs could use in the pre-formation stage of 
alliances (Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012; Katila et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2014). This study 
looks at the post-formation strategies SMEs can use to enhance their benefits from asymmetric 
alliances. It examines whether SMEs that possess unique value could gain more from the 
alliances, and investigate whether SMEs’ dependence on their partners would reduce these 
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benefits.   
This study is an attempt to explore the interfirm relationships in alliances with great 
partner asymmetries. I contend that SMEs and make efforts to enhance partner cohesion to gain 
more benefits from asymmetric alliances. This study considers both the competition and 
cooperation of alliance partners and pays attention to their interplay. Through examining SMEs’ 
gains and compromise in dealing with powerful and large-sized partners, I expect to provide 
management implications of alliance strategies for the firms that are constrained in size, business 
scale, and network resources.  
To test the theories and hypotheses, I employ a data of small- and medium-sized Japanese 
trading companies. This sector is dominated by several industrial giants, Sogo Shosha3 (general 
trading companies), which possess large market shares and vast industrial network, as well as 
efficient and stable relationships with big banks. Acting in the same market and dealing with 
similar products, small- and medium-sized Japanese trading companies (shortened as SMTCs in 
the following text) have business overlap with Sogo Shosha. However, these two types of firms 
have huge distinctions in size, resource, network and business affiliation. SMTCs, despite their 
active engagement in the Japanese economy and overseas investments, are not to threaten Sogo 
Shosha. Hence, the alliances between SMTCs and Sogo Shosha are asymmetric alliances with 
the former as the weak party. As international expansion is important to SMTC in survival and 
growth, I do an analysis of SMTCs’ international expansion to examine their strategies in 
asymmetric alliances.     
 
                                                 
3 The Japanese term Sogo Shosha means general (総合 Sogo) trading company (商社 Shosha).  This study uses 
Sogo Shosha for both of its singular and plural forms.  
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Chapter 8 Theory and Hypotheses 
8.1 SMEs’ alliances with large and resourceful firms 
Seen from a perspective of Resource Dependence Theory, interfirm alliances can be a tool that 
firms use to manage their dependence on others (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer and 
Nowak, 1976). SMEs that are relatively limited in internal and social resources can use alliances 
to make up their weakness in size, network, and social status. Industrial giant firms with their 
abundant resources and vast social networks are attractive partners to SMEs. Not only the 
resources of those large and resourceful firms can supplement SMEs’ shortage in capabilities 
(Osborn and Baughn, 1990), but also the alliances with giants per se is an endorsement that 
enhances the business creditability of SMEs (Stuart, 2000). SMEs could also expect from their 
giant partners’ network resources, market information and social status (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Lavie, 2006). Moreover, the alliances with large and resourceful partners also enable SMEs to 
access to their networks and to explore opportunities to form alliances with third-party firms 
(Dussauge et al., 2004; Madhok and Tallman, 1998). 
Although an alliance with large and resourceful partners could potentially strengthen 
SMEs’ capabilities, it poses a high risk to them at the same time. First, the power imbalance 
between SMEs and industrial giant firms hurts partner cooperation. Giants with their rich 
resources and dense networks are usually more capable of locating and attracting new alliance 
partners (Ahuja et al., 2009; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). SMEs that are limited in partnering 
opportunities are more dependent on their large and resourceful partners (Casciaro and Piskorski, 
2005; Gulati and Sytch, 2007) while they also rely on their partners to seek new partners. A 
power imbalance in the alliance leads to a renegotiation of agreements on resource commitment 
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and value splitting (Ahuja et al., 2009). Power imbalance also encourages opportunism and 
misappropriation in the alliance. Large and resourceful firms could take the advantages of SMEs 
in value splitting and knowledge sharing (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Arino and De La Torre, 
1998). All these can lead to conflicts and inter-partner rivalry in dyadic relationships. Moreover, 
large and resourceful firms with their informational advantages and network connectedness can 
gain SMEs’ knowledge and innovative capabilities, while the latter have difficulties in obtaining 
the competitive capabilities of their partners in production, marketing and network (Alvarez and 
Barney, 2001; Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Zollo et al., 2002). Lack of balance in alliance benefits 
can harm cohesion and impede partner integration. As such, even if SMEs have managed to form 
alliances with giant firms, they still face the problems of benefiting from such asymmetric 
alliances.  
8.2 SMEs’ strategies for benefits from asymmetric alliances 
Scholars have been aware of the point that SMEs need to use strategies to abstract more value 
from asymmetric alliances and reduce possible hazards. However, the emphasis of most of the 
studies has been placed on firms’ strategies to protect themselves from value misappropriation 
(Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012; Katila et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2014). Research on 
entrepreneurial firms would emphasize the selection of partners to reduce the risk of disputes 
(Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012; Katila et al., 2008). Research on technological and R&D 
alliances examine the protection arrangement to avoid misappropriation, such as using patent and 
secrecy, and fostering mutual trust, as well as forming exploitation alliances rather than 
exploration ones (Yang et al., 2014).  
Although those strategies add to the capabilities of SMEs in their competition against 
their large partners with respect to value splitting or knowledge sharing, they might not fit the 
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nature of asymmetric alliances. Given that SMEs are weak in bargaining power and lack the 
capability to secure their economic interest, focusing on self-protection and interpartner 
competition is a difficult task to them. Not only that SMEs are possibly incapable of resisting 
value misappropriation (Alvarez and Barney, 2001), but also that this competition could arouse 
interpartner rivalry and create instability in the alliance (Park and Russo, 1996; Park and Ungson, 
2001; Polidoro et al., 2011). Large and resourceful firms, in their considerations, would form 
alliances with SMEs because such alliances pose a low risk of misappropriation to them (Doz, 
1987), and because they can secure resource commitment from SMEs (Castellucci and Ertug, 
2010).  Large firms also face the risk of a discount in status due to their alliances with SMEs that 
usually have low prestige (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Castellucci and Ertug, 2010; Yan and 
Gray, 1994, 2001). Large firms would weigh the gain and loss in their considerations to give 
SMEs the access to their internal and social resources. Under the circumstance, SMEs might face 
the tradeoff between obtaining resources from giant partners and protecting their interest. The 
literature has documented that small firms would let large firms take the ownership control of 
their joint ventures (Ahuja et al., 2009), and commit more resources (Castellucci and Ertug, 
2010).  
Seeing from a perspective of partner complementarity, SMEs have space to use strategies 
to benefit from asymmetric alliances. Alliance not only facilitates the exchange of internal 
resource exchange between partners but also constitutes a conduit for social resources (Gulati, 
1998). Newly development in resource-based view takes the alliance as a governance structure 
that facilitates value creation through resource exchange (Lavie, 2006). Interfirm alliances can 
create new values such as technology spillover (Alvarez and Barney, 2001), social status transfer 
(Stuart et al., 1999), and new alliance opportunities with third partners (Gulati and Gargiulo, 
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1999). As such, SMEs can put emphasis on resource sharing that could create new values for 
them.  
Whether or not SMEs’ are able to abstract value from the asymmetric alliances depends 
on their relationships with giant firms. If SMEs could provide unique value to their large partners, 
they could expect more return from the partnerships as well. The entrepreneurial firms, for 
example, can appeal to established firms with their advancement in technology and innovation 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Katila et al., 2008). If SMEs are capable of increasing their 
bargaining power against their large partners, they are more capable of manipulating the 
alliances for their benefits. To reduce their dependence on partners, SMEs could leverage their 
unique value that complements their partners’ resource profile (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997) or 
explores more alliance opportunities to reduce the dependence on the larger firms (Singh and 
Mitchell, 1996). Moreover, giant firms might need SMEs to coordinate their competitive strategy 
to fight against powerful rivals (Silverman and Baum, 2002). If SMEs could cooperative and be 
trustful allies of their large partners, they might gain the trust of the latter and enhance partner 
cohesion (Das and Teng, 1998). In general, SMEs should leverage their competitive advantages 
in those aspects and trade them for expected resources, rather than compete on the benefits (such 
as economic return) that their giant partners desire. 
8.3 Benefits of asymmetric alliances in international expansion  
International expansion is an important firm strategy for growth and profit-making. Firms can 
expand to foreign markets to shun harsh domestic competition and initiate entrepreneurial 
investment (Barringer and Greening, 1998; Oviatt and McDougall, 2005; Zahra, Ireland, and Hitt, 
2000). The overseas operation is expensive to firms as it requires heavy investment in capital, 
technology and human resources (Hymer, 1976) while it is also risky as firms have to deal with 
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unfamiliar institutions and foreign culture (Zaheer, 1995). SMEs have great difficulties to 
overcome the liability of foreignness and newness in host countries (Gomes-Casseres, 1997; Lu 
and Beamish, 2001; Zaheer, 1995) because the learning of foreign environments, the long-
distance communication between headquarter and subsidiaries, and the interaction with local 
governments require great resources and efforts.  
SMEs could seek for interfirm partnerships to reduce cost, enlarge market power and 
share risk in overseas operation (Gulati, 1998; Kogut, 1988). They can also use alliance partners 
as sources of information that bring knowledge about the foreign market and non-business 
environments (Makino and Delios, 1996). The alliance with large and resourceful firms becomes, 
then, a useful strategy for SMEs that are engaged in international expansion. Large partners can 
provide SMEs a variety of forms of financial and human resource to aid their internationalization 
and speed up such expansion (Chang and Rhee, 2011). Especially, the large firms that have 
experience in international expansion can provide knowledge about various aspects of the host 
country environments. Their local networks in host countries can help SMEs reduce the 
uncertainty of governmental policy and political expropriation (Delios and Henisz, 2003). 
Furthermore, some large firms have spread their prestige and reputation in foreign countries, thus, 
can endorse SMEs with creditability in doing business in new markets (Stuart et al., 1999), and 
help reduce entry barriers and cost (Podolny, 1993).  
SMEs can use their large partners to access to network resources that enhance 
international expansion. Firms with common partners are more likely to enter cooperative 
relationships because they tend to use their existing social connectedness to collect information 
of potential partners (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, 1994). Large firms can mediate the 
alliance and connection formation between SMEs and their connected clients and partners. These 
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new partnering opportunities are critical to SMEs that need to enter a host country and expand 
local networks. In general, the alliances with giant firms bring SMEs valuable internal and social 
resources and enable them to expand fast to international markets.   
8.4 Leveraging unique value 
Firms can use alliances as a mean to obtain the resources that they do not possess (Zaheer, Gulati, 
and Nohria, 2000), so they would attach great importance to the match between their resource 
profile and that of partners. As dissimilar resource profile of partners suggests that they could 
generate synergy (Harrison et al., 2001; Medcof, 1997), forming alliances with dissimilar 
partners becomes a typical alignment of alliances. The alliances between SMEs and large and 
resourceful firms could be outcomes of their seeking resource complementarity, such as 
technological startups forming alliances with industrial giants (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Katila 
et al., 2008), multinational enterprises with their technology and management expertise forming 
international joint ventures with local firms of host countries (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997), and 
small firms possessing large market shares in low-end products forming alliances with high-
status firms (Podolny, 1993). The partners with dissimilar resource profile could generate an 
above-normal return through a creative combination of their resources (Dussauge et al., 2000; 
Harrison et al., 2001; Kogut, 1988; Madhok and Tallman, 1998).  
       SMEs possessing a dissimilar profile of host countries add to the value of their alliances 
with large partners. When their large partners have been acting in some host countries that SMEs 
have not entered, SMEs could use the expertise and management experience of their larger 
partners (Makino and Delios, 1996) and connect to their local network (Inkpen and Beamish, 
1997). When SMEs have been operating in the markets where their large partner have not started 
a business, the latter would also value the experience and knowledge of SMEs have gained. 
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Especially, those large firms following a globalization strategy would highly evaluate SMEs’ 
presence in foreign countries that they have not entered yet or have not many subsidiaries. As 
such, whose host country experience differs from that of their larger partners bring 
complementarity to those alliances and thus synergistic value. 
As partner firms’ resource and capability lay the foundation for their contributions to the 
alliance, as well as the bargaining power against each other (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005), 
SMEs with unique resources can increase their bargaining power in the partnerships. They could 
leverage this advantages for more support from their giant partners. Furthermore, as 
complementarity creates a mutual dependence (Dussauge et al., 2000; Kogut, 1988), partners 
with dissimilar resources could strengthen their partnerships. Close relationships with giant 
partners encourage SMEs to expand internationally. Based on the above analysis, I propose the 
first hypothesis about the positive moderating effects of resource dissimilarity between SMEs 
and large and resourceful firms.  
Hypothesis 1: The alliances with large and resourceful firms have positive effects on SMEs’ 
internationalization when partners have fewer overlap in host country spread.  
8.5 Excessive embeddedness to dyadic relationships 
While the alliances with large partners might help SMEs expand to foreign markets, these 
benefits do not always increase as their dyadic relationships deepen. Prior studies on interfirm 
alliance usually emphasize the prior cooperation between two firms that generates knowledge-
based trust and partner cohesion (Das and Teng, 1998; Gulati, 1995; McEvily, Perrone, and 
Zaheer, 2003), while they have less discussed the downside of relational embeddedness (an 
exception see Ahuja et al., 2009). While prior relationships ease dyadic collaboration, it also 
makes firms embedded deeply in the dyadic relationship and reduces flexibility in partnering 
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(Uzzi, 1996, 1997).  
SMEs’ bias toward giant partners could increase their dependence on the latter (Uzzi, 
1997). Excessive embeddedness to a partnership usually means that firms face more constraints 
from partners, and the pressure of rigidity and conformity (Granovetter, 1985). This issue is 
severe in the cases of asymmetric alliances where SMEs have relatively weak power and are 
incapable of taking the lead of dyadic relationship (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Ma et al., 2012). 
Asymmetric partners might have the problems of opportunism that powerful firms apply their 
power to grab benefits and enforce unfair value splitting (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Greve et al., 
2010) while the weaker party has difficulties in securing their interest. Hence, as SMEs become 
more dependent on their large partners, they also face increasing misappropriation.  
Excessive embeddedness in dyadic relationships gives rise to the concerns of losing 
flexibility in partnering. As central firms are usually rich in information and more capable of 
coping with uncertainty, peripheral firms would prefer central firms as potential partners to other 
peripheral ones (Ahuja et al., 2009). Analogously, SMEs might find their giant partner are more 
capable of overcoming external risk and turbulence. As SMEs have limited managerial resources 
to maintain alliance partners, they have to concentrate their resource on critical social 
relationships. Once SMEs obtain high-quality network resources through alliances with large 
firms, they might abandon the collaboration with other firms and thus ignore potentially better 
alliance opportunities (Greve et al., 2013; McEvily et al., 2003). Hence, excessive investment in 
social ties with giant firms might not always benefit SMEs. 
          Excessive embeddedness to the existing social relationships also blocks firms from 
developing their firm-specific capability. SMEs’ deep relationships with their giant partners 
could affect their international expansion. As the relationships with giant partners deepen,  SMEs 
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have to invest more asset specificity in cater to the needs of the alliances (Riordan and 
Williamson, 1985). As an example, SMEs might focus on the foreign markets where their 
partners could provide network resources and information (Delios and Henisz, 2003). Moreover, 
once SMEs are heavily relying on their large partners in exploring foreign markets, they would 
gradually lose their capability in search and risk-taking, which eventually undermine their 
capability of international expansion (Uzzi, 1996). Those negative consequences can impede 
SMEs from further expansion to foreign countries. In general, SMEs’ benefit from the alliances 
with giant partners would be reduced once SMEs become more embedded in the partnerships. 
Hence, I propose the following hypothesis about the liability of excessive embeddedness in 
asymmetric alliances.  
Hypothesis 2: The alliances with giant firms have weak effects on SMEs’ internationalization 
when partners form more joint ventures.  
8.6 Exclusivity in partnering   
The power imbalance between asymmetric alliance partners requires that the weaker party 
contributes more to rebalance their relationships. As alliance is a widely used strategy to 
compete in the market (Gomes-Casseres, 1994), one contribution the weak party could make is 
to cooperate with the competition strategy of the strong (Gulati, 1998). Studies show that firms’ 
strategic alliances would exert competitive pressure on rivals and affect their performance and 
survival (Gimeno, 2004). This competitive pressure motivates the strong firms to ask for loyalty 
from their weak partners.  
           Studies show that a firm’s benefits from alliances will increase with the total capabilities 
of its partners (Gomes-Casseres, 1997), and a firm can also yield better performance with large 
network resources (Lavie, 2007; Stuart, 2000). The alliance with multiple large firms enables 
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SMEs to access to various resources and potentially make creative combinations. Various 
network resources are useful to SMEs that are aiming to expand internationally, as it provides 
opportunities for them to take the advantage of arbitrage in different host countries (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1990). Moreover, SMEs’ seeking for multiple giant partners is also a way to reduce 
their dependence on one partner (Singh and Mitchell, 1996). Forming alliance with multiple 
giant partners allows SMEs to have alternatives and enhances their bargaining power to the 
current partner. These benefits motivate SMEs to form alliances with multiple large firms to 
enlarge the pool of social resources. 
However, the alliances with multiple giant firms could bring trust and coordination 
problems to the partnership. Once SMEs are allying with multiple giant partners and are not 
exclusive to one, giant firms might not take these SMEs as a comrades-in-arms. This situation 
could be a severe issue when giant firms view each other as rivals. Indeed, allying with the firms 
that are the partners of the rivals would harm the competitive strategy of the focal large firms 
(Gimeno, 2004). The concerns of the knowledge and information leakage to rivals through the 
SMEs might undermine giant firms’ trust in the SMEs (Das and Teng, 1998; Das and Teng, 
2001). Under the circumstance, giant firms might not fully support those SMEs in their 
international expansion.  
Speaking of SMEs’ concerns, allying with multiple large firms could pose them the risk 
of the involvement in the competition between giant firms. The competition among a firm’s 
partners would create opportunistic behavior, disputes, and leakage of resources (Lavie, 2007), 
which might reduce the focal firm’s benefits from its alliance portfolio. It could be especially for 
SMEs that lack the power and capabilities to mediate and moderate the conflicts between two 
large firm allies. Moreover, multiple alliances with different giant partners will create the 
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problems of incompatibility that will incur high coordination cost. SMEs that are constrained in 
management resources could have difficulties to handle the high cost of alliance management as 
the partner number increases. As such, there are both benefits and hazards in SMEs’ choice to 
form alliances with multiple large firms. Thus, I make two competing hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3: The alliances with large and resourceful firms have positive effects on SMEs’ 
internationalization when SMEs have more than one large partner. 
Hypothesis 4: The alliances with large and resourceful firms have negative effects on SMEs’ 
internationalization when SMEs have more than one large partner.  
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Chapter 9 Research Design and Methods 
9.1 Japanese trading companies   
I use data of Japanese trading companies to test the above hypotheses. The research objectives 
are the small- and medium-sized trading companies (shortened as SMTCs) that are listed on 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. The sector of “whole sales” in the Japanese economy is featured with 
several giant firms Sogo Shosha (general trading companies) and more than 10 thousand smaller 
trading companies (USITC, 1990). Japanese trading companies are mainly engaged in wholesale 
trading at different stages of the value chain, including market intelligence, raw materials 
purchasing, and final product marketing (Yoshino and Lifson, 1986:2). They also undertake 
logistics and shipment with an extensive range of import and export services, as well as provide 
marketing and trading services and many other services such as financing, insurance, 
transportation, and warehousing.   
Sogo Shosha, the giant trading companies, distinguish themselves from the ordinary 
trading companies in several ways. First, Sogo Shosha are huge in size and business scales. In 
2012, the largest five Sogo Shosha had an average sales volumes of 123 billion US dollars and an 
average asset of 80 billion dollars, as well as an average net profit of 3 billion dollars (Ryan, 
2013) 4. A typical Sogo Shosha has over 500 subsidiaries (more than 50% of the ownership) and 
affiliated companies (20% -50% of the ownership) and has 50,000 to 60,000 employees. 
Throughout the 1980s, the nine largest Sogo Shosha accounted for fully 65% of all Japan’s 
imports and around 50% of its exports. According to Overseas Japanese Companies5, Sogo 
Shosha also has a great scale of international operations. The total employee of the largest seven 
                                                 
4 All the data and statistics in this paragraph is quoted from Ryan’s (2013) report. 
5 See the Method section of this paper for more details. 
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Sogo Shosha on average reaches 5868 throughout the period of 1990-2009. Their foreign 
subsidiaries represent 15% of all Japanese foreign subsidiaries in 1990, 13.8% in 2000, and 10% 
in 2009. Compared to these huge firms, SMTCs are all small-sized businesses.  
The second distinction is that Sogo Shosha are the cores of their respective business 
groups, Keiretsu6. Sogo Shosha play as a coordinator in the system of Keiretsu while they are 
also dealing with trading business and logistics of the member firms. This study identifies seven 
Sogo Shosha: Mitsubishi (Mitsubishi Group), Mitsui (Mitsui Group), Itochu (DKB Group), 
Sumitomo (Sumitomo Group), Marubeni (Fuyo Group), Toyota Tsusho (Mitsui Group) and 
Sojitz (Sanwa group)7. As the leader firms of their own Keiretsu, Sogo Shosha play a central role 
in knitting network of affiliated firms, e.g., facilitating joint venture formation, monitoring 
member’s behavior and even launching restructurings (Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004:127). They 
also manage member firms’ outside network of subcontractors and clients (Yoshino and Lifson, 
1986:51). For SMTCs, Sogo Shosha is a gatekeeper that decides whether SMTCs can do 
business with Keiretsu member firms. Sogo Shosha provide Keiretsu member firms information 
about new alliance opportunities (Das and Teng, 1998). Sogo Shosha could mediate and facilitate 
alliance formation between SMTCs and Keiretsu-affiliates, and they also continue to stabilize 
their partnerships in the course of alliance with their third-party supervision (Polidoro et al., 
2011). Sogo Shosha and SMTCs have overlapped business despite that they are doing business in 
different scales and amounts. In their expansion to international markets, Sogo Shosha and 
SMTCs form joint ventures or do portfolio co-investments.  
                                                 
6 The Japanese term Keiretsu (系列) means system or series, which refers to the Japanese business groups. This 
study use Keiretsu for both its singular and plural forms. 
7 The big 5, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Itochu and Sumitomo have their history back to the Second World War. 
Toyoda Tsusho had been the trading subsidiary of Toyota Motor Corporation that handled mostly motor vehicle and 
motor vehicle parts, but eventually became a Sogo Shosha and merged another large trading company Tomen in 
2006. Sojitz was formed in 2004 by the merger of Nissho Iwai Corporation and Nichimen Corporation. 
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       Another distinguished capability of Sogo Shosha is their financial business. Sogo Shosha 
can provide industrial firms with various forms of financial resources. In Japan, major banks will 
lend loans to Sogo Shosha, which in turn use the fund to invest in other industrial firms (Gerlach, 
1992). Since Sogo Shosha have advantages in knowing their partner firms well and having rich 
experience in foreign countries, they could reduce transaction cost and uncertainty in overseas 
investment. Studies show that Sogo Shosha are active in co-financing the projects that initiated 
by industrial companies, especially the overseas joint ventures (Yoshihara, 1982:174). Sogo 
Shosha provide a variety of forms, including the extension of trade credit, advance payments, 
short-and long-term loans, loan guarantees, and even leasing of properties and equipment. To a 
certain extent, Sogo Shosha are playing bank-like roles in the Japanese economy. Moreover, 
Sogo Shosha also help industrial with managerial consulting when they establish subsidiaries in 
foreign countries.  
9.2 Data and sample   
The sample to test the hypotheses is a combination of two databases. The first one is Nikkei 
Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS), a database operated by Nikkei Digital Media. 
This database provides corporate financial information of the listed firms in Japanese stock 
markets. The alliance activities and international expansion of SMTCs are obtained from 
Overseas Japanese Companies, a database run by Toyo Kaizai Inc.(Keizai, 2015). This database 
contains the data of Japanese firms’ foreign direct investment (FDI), including joint ventures and 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
With SMTCs as the research objectives, I locate all those firms in the industrial sector 
“Whole Sales” of Japanese stock exchanges, which contains the firms that are mainly engaged in 
trading business. The seven Sogo Shosha are also in this sector. I have excluded five SMTCs that 
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are affiliated with Keiretsu or partially owned by Keiretsu member firms while I keep five firms 
that are affiliated with some other small business groups8. Those small business groups are much 
smaller in the comparison to the big six Keiretsu regarding size and scale, as well as the weight 
in the Japanese economy. The final sample contains 187 Japanese SM-trading companies that are 
listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange (159 firms) and other stock and security exchanges of Japan (92 
firms in Fukuoka or Nagoya stock exchange)9.  
I use the total employee of a firm to identify small- and medium-sized firms. Many firms 
have been changing the size and business scale during the observation window of this study 
(1999-2009). There are 150 firms out of 187 have up to 500 employees throughout whole period 
while the rest could exceed this number in some years. The sample average of the total employee 
of SMTCs is 488, making only one-twelfth of that of the seven Sogo Shosha (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
Itochu, Sumitomo, Marubeni and Toyota Tsusho). As this research emphasizes the partner 
asymmetries between partners, I retain all those small trading companies in analysis and name 
them as “small- and medium-sized trading companies” 10 (SMTCs). As small as they are in size, 
those SMTCs are not young. Only six firms were established after 1990 while the rest have an 
average age at 40 in 1990. SMTCs as a group are providing trading services to diverse industries, 
but every firm usually specializes in one or two industries (two-digit industrial codes).  
The final sample contains 187 SMTCs that are acting during 1990-2009 in foreign 
countries. The total observation is 3710, with 3590 cases (99.5%) entering the regressions 
                                                 
8 I use the online portals of SMTCs and various sources (including the two main datasets of this study) to obtain 
their ownership structure and shareholders. I decide a SMTCs to be a Keiretsu-affiliate or Keiretsu-related one if 
more than 5% of its equity shares is owned by a Keiretsu-affiliated firm.  
9 It is normal that a small trading company started with its IPO in Fukuoka or Nagoya stock markets before it 
managed to get listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
10 I define a firm as small-and medium-sized when its total employee is no larger than 500. The definition of small- 
and medium-sized enterprise varies over countries, industrial sector and time periods. This study uses the definition 
made by United States Small Business Administration (http://www.sba.gov/content/small-business-size-standards) 
and Industry department of the Government of Canada ( http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/eng/h_02800.html).    
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because six firms are excluded in fixed effects regressions due to time-invariant variables. These 
six firms either has alliance ties with Sogo Shosha in all years, or they have not expanded to 
foreign countries. Table 6 represents the descriptive statistics of the samples. 
9.3 Variables and analytical models   
Dependent variables. I use two dependent variables to test the hypotheses of this study. 
The first dependent variable entry counts is the count of new FDI the SMTCs has established in 
foreign countries in a year. I denote a new FDI when the firm establishes a new subsidiary, form 
a new joint venture or co-invest in an existing venture. Since entry counts are non-negative 
integers that range from 0 to 27, I fit the regressions with negative binomial models. For 
robustness check, I also dichotomize entry counts to generate the second dependent variable 
entry and fit it with logistic models. Entry is coded 1 when entry counts is larger than zero, and 0 
otherwise. Both dependent variables measure the international expansion of SMTCs. I lead entry 
counts and entry for one year to test the lagged effects of the independent variables. This 
operation turns the sample to be right-censored in 2009, where I set all the values of dependent 
variables to zero. The main variables and their measures are listed in Table 5 on the following 
page. 
Independent variables. The critical independent variable Sogo-Shosha Tie is a binary 
variable that takes 1 if the firm has an equity alliance with Sogo Shosha and 0 otherwise. I denote 
an equity alliance when the SMTC owns a joint venture (subsidiary) jointly with a Sogo Shosha, 
regardless of the ownership structure of the joint venture11.  
                                                 
11 Generally speaking, a joint venture is defined when each parent firms owns 5%-95% of the equity shares. In their 
1010 jointly owned subsidiaries, SMTCs own on average 13.3% of the equity shares (with a standard deviation of 
0.165) and Sogo Shosha own 10.4% (with a standard deviation of 0.136).  
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A binary variable; it takes 1 if firm enters foreign countries in a year; or 0 otherwise. This variable is led one year 
forward. 
Entry counts count of entries in foreign countries in a year 
Independent variables 
Sogo-Shosha-tie A binary variable; it takes 1 if the firm has an alliance with Sogo Shosha, and 0 otherwise 
Country overlap Count of countries that SM-trading companies overlap with its Sogo Shosha allies 
Single joint venture A binary variable; it takes 1 if the firm has one joint venture or subsidiary with Sogo Shosha, and 0 otherwise 
Multiple joint ventures 
A binary variable; it takes 1 if the firm has two or more joint ventures or subsidiaries with Sogo Shosha, and 0 
otherwise 
No tie A binary variable; it takes 1 if the firm has no alliance tie with Sogo Shosha, and 0 otherwise.  
One Sogo Shosha ally A binary variable; it takes 1 if the firm has an alliance with only one Sogo Shosha, and 0 otherwise.  
Multiple Sogo Shosha allies A binary variable; it takes 1 if the firm has alliances with more than one Sogo Shosha, and 0 otherwise.  
Firm characteristics 
Firm age Yearly age 
employee Count number; firm’s total employee 
ROA A ratio; firm’s yearly return on asset 
Advertisement A ratio; firm’s advertisement expense to total sales 
Export Ratio of firm’s export to total sales 
Foreign subsidiaries Count number; firm’s foreign subsidiaries 
Country spread Count number of foreign countries where the focal firm has subsidiaries 
Local experience Sum of subsidiaries multiplied by their age respectively 
partners Count number of the firms’ alliance partners 
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The test of Hypothesis 1 employs another independent variable country overlap, which is 
a count of the overlapped host countries in which both the SMTC and its Sogo Shosha allies are 
acting. I have several independent variables to test Hypothesis 2 regarding the diminish effects of 
Sogo Shosha ties on the SMTCs’ international expansion. Three dummies, No Tie, Single Joint 
Venture and Multiple Joint Ventures, denote the strength of ties between SMTCs and Sogo 
Shosha. A largr number of joint ventures (subsidiaries) indicates strong ties. No Tie takes 1 if the 
SMTC has no tie with Sogo Shosha in a year, and 0 otherwise. Single Joint Venture takes 1 if the 
SMTC has only one joint venture (subsidiary) with Sogo Shosha, and 0 otherwise. Multiple Joint 
Ventures takes 1 if the SMTC has two or more joint ventures (subsidiaries) with Sogo Shosha, 
and 0 otherwise. As such, these three dummies denote all the three situations that how SMTCs 
are connected to Sogo Shosha.  
To test Hypothesis 3 and 4 regarding the effects of multiple Sogo Shosha allies, I code 
two more dummies variables. One Sogo Shosha ally is a binary variable that takes 1 if the SMTC 
is allying with only one Sogo Shosha, and 0 otherwise. Multiple Sogo Shosha allies is a binary 
variable that takes 1 if the SMTC are allying with more than one Sogo Shosha allies, and 0 
otherwise.  
Control variables. I use two sets of variables to capture the effects of firm-level and 
country-level characteristics on SMTC’s internationalization. At the firm levels, I control for 
firm age as the yearly age of the firm. Employee is the log of the total employee of the firm, 
which is to capture the effects of firm size. Partners is the count of the focal firm’s alliance 
partners in a year, which excludes the Sogo Shosha partners. As the performance of SMEs is 
associated with their propensity to internationalization (Lu and Beamish, 2001), I control for 
firms’ return on asset, shortened as ROA, which is the ratio of net income to the total asset. I use 
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Advertisement, the ratio of advertisement expense to total sales, to account for the firms’ 
visibility in the network that could affect their alliance opportunity (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; 
Podolny, 1994). Export is the ratio of firms’ export volume to total sales, which captures the 
effects of export intensity on firms’ FDI propensity (Kogut and Chang, 1996; Lu and Beamish, 
2001). Because trading companies usually invest little in R&D, I do not include R&D intensity 
in the models. 
Besides the firm characteristic variables regarding finance and resource, I also include 
several variables to denote its international experience. Foreign subsidiaries is a firm’s count of 
overseas subsidiaries, regardless of the ownership structure of the subsidiaries. Country spread is 
the count of host countries where the firm has been operating subsidiaries, which denotes the 
degree of internationalization of SMTCs.  
Two country-level variables are included to denote the levels of Japanese FDI in the host 
country. Density is the log of total Japanese subsidiaries in the host country, which measures the 
level of peers competition (Lu and Ma, 2008). Sogo Shosha subsidiaries is the count number of 
Sogo Shosha subsidiaries in the host country, which measures the presence of Sogo Shosha in a 
country.  
The descriptive statistics of the sample with the inter-correlation of the main variables are 
stated in Table 6.  
Analytical Models. I use two sorts of analytical models to fit the regressions. Fixed 
effects negative binomial models are employed in Model (1) -(7), in which the dependent 
variable entry count contains non-negative count numbers and a great quantity of zero. A Vuong 
test (Vuong, 1989) shows that normal negative binomial model is preferred to zero-inflated 
negative binomial model to fit the dependent variables. Conditional fixed-effects logistic models 
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are used in Model (8)-(14). The fixed-effects logistic model controls for other unobservable firm-
level characteristics that could affect a firm’s international expansion. It is powerful in 
eliminating possible factors of the firm that could affect their propensity to form alliances with 
Sogo Shosha and to expand internationally at the same time, and thus, reduces the risk of 
endogeneity problems of the independent variables. However, the fixed-effects logistic models 
exclude the observations that have no variance in variables and reduce the sample size as well 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005:796).  
Endogeneity problems. I also consider the possible endogeneity issues that SMTCs could 
simultaneously have the intention to expand internationally and form alliances with Sogo Shosha. 
Given that Sogo Shosha are actively involved in FDI and overseas trading, SMTCs that are more 
capable of international expansion could be attractive to Sogo Shosha as well. I employ a set of 
techniques to reduce this risk of endogeneity.  
First, I take one-year lag of all the independent variables to allow for time effect, which 
can reduce simultaneous correlation between independent and dependent variables. Second, I use 
Heckman two-stage method to correct the possible bias that allying with Sogo Shosha is 
endogenous to internationalization. In the first step of Heckman correction, I code a variable Tie 
formation, which takes 1 if the focal SMTC has formed an alliance with Sogo Shosha in a given 
year, and 0 otherwise. I use Probit model to regress Tie formation on a set of variables that could 
determine SMTCs’ decision in alliance formation but are unrelated to their internationalization. 
By so doing, I obtain the Inverse Mills Ratio of the variable Sogo-Shosha-tie and put it in the 
major regressions to absorb the effects of unobservable variables.  
In the first step regression, I include a set of firm-specific variables that could affect the 
alliance formation with Sogo Shosha. Those variables are assumed not to be related to SMTCs’ 
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international expansion in a direct way. Manufacturing is a binary variable that takes 1 if the 
SMTC is producing commodities, and 0 otherwise. Headquarter in Tokyo is a binary variable 
that takes 1 if the headquarter of the SMTC is located in Tokyo, the capital city of Japan and the 
location of Tokyo Stock Exchange. This variable should capture the effects of the localization of 
tie formation (Glückler, 2007). The time-variant binary variable Listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange 
takes 1 if the SMTC is listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise (firms could be listed in 
Fukuoka or Osaka stock exchange). This variable accounts for the social status and visibility of 
SMTCs that affect their capabilities to form alliances with Sogo Shosha (Benjamin and Podolny, 
1999; Podolny, 1994). Financing with Keiretsu-affiliated Banks is a binary variable that takes 1 
if the SMTC has been financing with a Keiretsu-affiliated bank and 0 otherwise. This variable is 
from Toyo Keizai’s publication Keiretsu Overview12 (Toyo Keizai, 1993, 1995, 2000) and the 
firms’ corporate websites. As Japanese banks play a role of mediating firms in alliance formation, 
this variable captures SMTCs’ accesses to Sogo Shosha. I also include Prior Sogo Shosha ties, 
the counts of equity alliances with Sogo Shosha in the previous year, which captures the previous 
relationships between firms on their propensity to form new ties (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). A 
set of firm-specific variables, along with year fixed effects dummies, are put in the regressions as 
well (as stated in Table 5). I lose one-year observations of 1990 by lagging all the explanatory 
variables for one year. In the consideration of the small sample size, I make up the missing value 
of the year 1990 with the value of the year 1991. The Inverse Mills Ratio is put back on the 
major regressions in Model (2) -(14). Table 7 on the following page states the descriptive 
statistics and the inter-correlations of the main variables in the first-step regression.  
                   
                                                 
12 Toyo Keizai Inc. publish the directory Keiretsu Overview (企業系列総覧) every several years. These directories 
detail ownership structure of six largest Keiretsu, their affiliated firms, general manager interlock and bank 
relationships etc.   
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics and inter-correlation of main variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1.entry count 1.00 
                 2.entry(firm-year) 0.60 1.00
                3. Firm age 0.02 0.06 1.00 
               4. employee 0.12 0.13 0.22 1.00 
              5. ROA 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.12 1.00 
             6. Advertisement 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 1.00 
            7. Export 0.06 0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.01 0.06 1.00 
           8. Foreign subsidiaries 0.34 0.35 0.16 0.22 -0.02 -0.01 0.12 1.00 
          9. Country spread 0.32 0.37 0.24 0.27 0.01 -0.06 0.11 0.89 1.00 
         10. partners 0.29 0.31 0.07 0.21 -0.01 -0.03 0.10 0.87 0.71 1.00
        11. inverted Mills ratio -0.23 -0.25 -0.09 -0.41 -0.03 0.25 0.00 -0.64 -0.59 -0.68 1.00
       12. country overlap 0.24 0.25 0.03 0.18 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.67 0.53 0.77 -0.63 1.00
      13. Sogo-Shosha tie 0.22 0.24 0.04 0.21 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.55 0.48 0.65 -0.73 0.67 1.00
     14. Single joint venture 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.07 0.10 0.12 -0.42 0.20 0.71 1.00
    15. Multiple joint venture 0.29 0.28 0.03 0.18 -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.71 0.57 0.80 -0.59 0.74 0.67 -0.05 1.00
   16. No tie -0.22 -0.24 -0.04 -0.21 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.55 -0.48 -0.65 0.73 -0.67 -1.00 -0.71 -0.67 1.00
  17. One Sogo Shosha ally  0.10 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.23 0.24 0.28 -0.52 0.25 0.80 0.89 0.20 -0.80 1.00
 18. Multiple Sogo Shosha allies 0.23 0.23 -0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.60 0.47 0.70 -0.49 0.77 0.56 -0.04 0.84 -0.56 -0.05 1.00
Mean 0.41 0.18 48.75 5.79 0.01 0.02 0.06 4.04 2.37 0.67 2.75 0.46 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.91 0.06 0.03 
Standard Deviation 1.44 0.39 18.75 0.92 0.07 0.04 0.10 8.11 3.21 2.12 0.74 2.04 0.29 0.22 0.20 0.29 0.24 0.17 
Min 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.08 -2.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 27.00 1.00 123.00 8.76 0.55 0.16 0.49 74.00 18.00 19.00 4.70 17.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 






Table 7: Statistics of the sample for the first-step regression of Heckman Corrections 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Tie formation 1.00 
          
2 Firm age 0.04 1.00 
         
3 Employee 0.18 0.22 1.00 
        
4 ROA -0.01 -0.07 0.12 1.00 
       
5 Advertisement Ratio -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 1.00 
      
6 Total subsidiary 0.55 0.16 0.21 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 
     
7 Prior Sogo Shosha tie 0.59 0.05 0.21 0.00 -0.03 0.56 1.00 
    
8 Manufacturing 0.03 0.19 0.11 -0.01 0.11 0.09 0.06 1.00 
   
9 Headquarter in Tokyo -0.11 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 0.01 -0.13 -0.07 -0.08 1.00 
  
10 Listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange 0.11 0.25 0.14 -0.03 -0.05 0.23 0.17 0.07 0.18 1.00 
 
11 Financing with Keiretsu-affiliated Banks 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.04 -0.06 1.00 
Mean 
0.05 48.75 5.79 0.01 0.02 3.73 0.09 0.50 0.56 0.65 0.67 
Standard Deviation 
0.22 18.75 0.92 0.07 0.04 7.85 0.28 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.47 
Min 
0.00 1.00 2.08 -2.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 
1.00 123.00 8.76 0.55 0.16 74.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 




Table 8: Probit panel regression for alliance decision with Sogo Shosha 
(the first-step regression of Heckman Corrections) 
Dependent Variable: Tie formation  
















































Total Subsidiary 0.04*** 
 (7.12) 




Headquarter in Tokyo -0.23* 
 (-2.00) 
Listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange 0.21 
 (1.37) 
Financing from Keiretsu-affiliated Banks 0.19 
 (1.52) 
Number of firm-years 3710 
Number of firms 187 
Log Likelihood -344.72 
Chi-square 804.09 




Chapter 10 Results 
Table 6 lists the descriptive statistics and the correlations between main variables. Table 7 list the 
descriptive statistics of the main variables that are used to generate Inverse Mill’s Ratio. Table 8 
is the first-step regression of Heckman two-stage method (used to produce Inverse Mill’s Ratio) 
with Tie formation as the dependent variable. Table 9 contains the regression results for testing 
Hypothesis 1-4 about the effects of Sogo Shosha tie on SMTCs’ international expansion. The 
dependent variable in these models is entry count, and the analytical model is a fixed-effects 
negative binomial model. Table 10 is the robustness check tests using fixed effects logistic 
regressions with Entry as the dependent variable. The number of observations is reduced from 
3710 to 3590 because six firms (120 observations) have time-invariant dependent variable or 
independent variables and are excluded from the fixed-effects regressions. 
 Model (1) is baseline regression that includes all the explanatory variables expect Sogo- 
Shosha tie and Inverse Mills Ratio. As the table shows, Employee and country spread have 
positively significant estimates, showing that firm size and the number of invested countries 
enhance the international expansion of SMTCs. I put on Sogo-Shosha tie and the Inverse Mills 
Ratio in Model (2). The key critical independent variable Sogo-Shosha tie is positively 
significant at 0.001 level while the Inverse Mills Ratio is significant at 0.05 level. This result 
indicates that the SMTCs that are allying with Sogo Shosha are more likely to establish new 
subsidiaries or join in existing ventures in foreign countries. A nested model test using the log-
likelihoods of two models shows that Model (2) has significantly improved the fitting of Model 
(1). The results show that the alliance tie with Sogo Shosha could help SMTCs speed up 
international expansion.  
Model (3) tests Hypothesis 1 that says the effects of the alliance with Sogo Shosha will be 
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reduced when the SMTC and their Sogo Shosha allies have an overlap in the portfolio of host 
countries. The interaction term between Sogo-Shosha tie and country overlap enters the 
regression of Model (3), where it obtains an estimate that is negatively significant. The estimate 
of Sogo-Shosha tie remains the sign and significance. This result supports Hypothesis 1 that the 
effects of Sogo-Shosha tie on SMTCs’ internationalization decrease as their overlap in host 
country portfolio increase.  
Model (4) contains two dummy variables Single Joint Venture and Multiple Joint 
Ventures with the reference group of No Tie. Results show that Single Joint Venture and Multiple 
Joint Ventures are both positively significant at 0.01 level. It means that compared to those firms 
that have no tie with Sogo Shosha, the firms that have joint ventures with Sogo Shosha are more 
capable of expanding to foreign markets. This result is a confirmation to that of Model (2) about 
the effects of the alliances with Sogo Shosha.  
Model (5) contains Multiple Joint Ventures and No tie as independent variables with the 
reference group of Single Joint Venture. This model tests whether the effects of Sogo Shosha tie 
will diminish when SMTC have multiple equity alliances with Sogo Shosha. No Tie is negatively 
significant at 0.01 level, a result that confirms the finding in Model (4) that firms that have one 
joint venture with Sogo Shosha are more likely to expand internationally than those have no tie 
with Sogo Shosha. Multiple Joint Ventures loses its significance (z-value=0.60), showing that 
multiple joint ventures with Sogo Shosha make no difference with Single Joint Venture regarding 
the international expansion. It turns out that more joint ventures with Sogo Shosha bring no 
further improvement in internationalization. The effects of alliances with Sogo Shosha will 
diminish as SMTCs become more embedded in the dyadic relationships with Sogo Shosha. The 
results support Hypothesis 2.  
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Model (6) contains two dummies One Sogo Shosha ally and Multiple Sogo Shosha allies 
with the reference group of no tie. This regression is to test Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 that 
says allying with more than two Sogo Shosha will enlarge or reduce the effects of Sogo Shosha 
tie. Both of these two dummies obtain positively significant estimates. It shows that as compared 
to those have no alliance with Sogo Shosha, firms that have alliances with Sogo Shosha, 
regardless of the number of Sogo Shosha allies, are more likely to expand internationally.   
Model (7) contains the dummies Multiple Sogo Shosha allies and no tie with the 
reference group of One Sogo Shosha ally. The estimate of no tie being negatively significant 
confirms the result of Model (6). Multiple Sogo Shosha allies turns to be non-significant in this 
regression(z-value=-0.96). This result means that it makes no difference in the benefits of 
internationalization when the SMTC attempts to increase the number of their Sogo Shosha 
partners from one to more. To summarize the results of Model (6) and Model (7), I conclude that 
the benefits of Sogo Shosha ties disappear when SMEs form alliances with more than one Sogo 
Shosha. It suggests that increasing Sogo Shosha ties might create two opposite forces that 
increase and decrease the effects of the alliances of Sogo Shosha at the same time. Hence, neither 
Hypothesis 4 or 5 is supported by the empirical tests, which is a result that implies that the 
hazards and benefits of multiple large partners coexist.  
To check the robustness of these above results, I continue to do a set of regressions as in 
Table 10. I replace the dependent variable to the binary variable entry in Model (8)-(14) and fit 
the regressions with fixed effects logistic models. In general, results are robust to that in Model 
(1)-(7), with most of the independent variables and interaction terms carrying the same estimated 
sign and significance levels. In Model (10) that is used to confirm the results of Model (3), the 
interaction term Sogo-Shosha tie × country overlap loses its significance with a z-value of -1.40. 
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In Model (13) that is corresponding to Model (6), Multiple Sogo Shosha allies is significant at 
0.1 level. This result suggests that allying with more than one Sogo Shosha bring very few 
benefit to SMTCs as compared to having no tie with Sogo Shosha. It supports Hypothesis 4 that 
the alliances with multiple giant partners will reduce the benefits of Sogo Shosha ties to zero.   
In general, the results of the regressions in Model (1) -(14) provide strong support to 
Hypothesis 1 and 2, while they suggest that either Hypothesis 3 and 4 only reveal one side of the 
mechanisms. The alliances with Sogo Shosha can help SMTCs to expand faster to foreign 
markets in general. These benefits are contingent on the match between SMTCs and Sogo 
Shosha allies in host country portfolio, and the alliance strategies of the focal SMTCs. When 
SMTCs are more embedded in dyadic relationships by forming multiple joint ventures with the 
same Sogo Shosha, or they are allying with more than one Sogo Shosha, the benefits of this Sogo 
Shosha tie will diminish.  
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Table 9: International expansion of Japanese small and medium-sized trading companies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Models 
Dependent variable: Entry count 
Firm age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.37) (0.60) (0.68) (0.66) (0.66) (0.50) (0.50) 
employee 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 
 (3.99) (4.15) (4.29) (4.10) (4.10) (4.21) (4.21) 
ROA -0.34 -0.34 -0.35 -0.34 -0.34 -0.36 -0.36 
 (-0.61) (-0.58) (-0.59) (-0.58) (-0.58) (-0.61) (-0.61) 
Advertisement -2.99 -3.66+ -3.67+ -3.71+ -3.71+ -3.50+ -3.50+ 
 (-1.53) (-1.83) (-1.83) (-1.85) (-1.85) (-1.74) (-1.74) 
Export 0.13 0.24 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
 (0.19) (0.34) (0.19) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
Foreign subsidiaries -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.70) (-0.34) (-0.21) (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.41) (-0.41) 
Country spread 0.08** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 
 (3.05) (2.86) (2.79) (2.78) (2.78) (2.92) (2.92) 
partners 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.33) (-0.33) (-0.44) (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.25) (-0.25) 
inverted Mills ratio  0.22* 0.25* 0.21* 0.21* 0.22* 0.22* 
  (2.09) (2.38) (2.05) (2.05) (2.16) (2.16) 
country overlap 0.01 0.01 0.13* 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.99) (0.29) (2.29) (0.16) (0.16) (0.64) (0.64) 
Sogo-Shosha tie  0.70*** 0.81***     
  (3.65) (4.15)     
Sogo-Shosha tie × country 
overlap 
  -0.13*     
   (-2.29)     
Single joint venture    0.66**    
    (3.21)    
Multiple joint ventures    0.80** 0.14   
    (3.16) (0.60)   
No tie     -0.66**  -0.74*** 
     (-3.21)  (-3.78) 
One Sogo Shosha ally      0.74***  
      (3.78)  
Multiple Sogo Shosha allies      0.54* -0.20 
      (2.13) (-0.96) 
Constant term -3.34*** -4.13*** -4.30*** -4.10*** -3.44*** -4.19*** -3.45*** 
 (-6.42) (-6.34) (-6.56) (-6.31) (-5.47) (-6.38) (-5.46) 
Number of observations 3590 3590 3590 3590 3590 3590 3590 
Number of firms 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 
Log-likelihood -2000.9 -1994.5 -1992.6 -1994.3 -1994.3 -1994.0 -1994.0 
Chi-square 62.05 75.71 80.17 76.29 76.29 76.88 76.88 
AIC value 4021.9 4012.9 4011.1 4014.5 4014.5 4014.0 4014.0 
                  z statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Table 10: Robustness check regressions (using fixed effects logistic models) 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Dependent variable: Entry  
Firm age 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03* 0.03* 
 (2.60) (2.58) (2.59) (2.73) (2.73) (2.56) (2.56) 
employee 0.46** 0.57*** 0.58*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 
 (2.73) (3.35) (3.41) (3.55) (3.55) (3.34) (3.34) 
ROA -0.53 -0.59 -0.58 -0.61 -0.61 -0.59 -0.59 
 (-0.70) (-0.75) (-0.74) (-0.78) (-0.78) (-0.75) (-0.75) 
Advertisement -5.39 -7.97 -7.83 -8.16 -8.16 -7.97 -7.97 
 (-0.82) (-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.22) (-1.22) (-1.19) (-1.19) 
Export 2.83+ 2.80+ 2.78+ 2.84+ 2.84+ 2.80+ 2.80+ 
 (1.94) (1.92) (1.90) (1.95) (1.95) (1.92) (1.92) 
Foreign subsidiaries -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.40) (-0.10) (-0.04) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.10) (-0.10) 
Country spread -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-0.32) (-0.50) (-0.54) (-0.64) (-0.64) (-0.50) (-0.50) 
partners 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.83) (0.41) (0.32) (0.26) (0.26) (0.40) (0.40) 
inverted Mills ratio  0.36** 0.40** 0.35** 0.35** 0.37** 0.37** 
  (2.71) (2.90) (2.60) (2.60) (2.70) (2.70) 
country overlap 0.05 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
 (1.28) (0.88) (1.63) (0.61) (0.61) (0.82) (0.82) 
Sogo-Shosha tie  0.94** 1.09***     
  (3.22) (3.51)     
Sogo-Shosha tie × country 
overlap 
  -0.15     
   (-1.40)     
Single joint venture    0.86**    
    (2.87)    
Multiple joint ventures    1.37** 0.51   
    (2.97) (1.21)   
No tie     -0.86**  -0.94** 
     (-2.87)  (-3.20) 
One Sogo Shosha ally      0.94**  
      (3.20)  
Multiple Sogo Shosha allies      0.93+ -0.01 
      (1.90) (-0.04) 
Number of observations 3590 3590 3590 3590 3590 3590 3590 
Number of firms 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 
Log-likelihood -1181.9 -1175.3 -1174.3 -1174.6 -1174.6 -1175.3 -1175.3 
Chi-square 20.80 34.09 36.18 35.56 35.56 34.10 34.10 
AIC value 2381.9 2372.7 2372.5 2373.1 2373.1 2374.6 2374.6 
           z statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Chapter 11 Conclusion and Discussion  
In this study, I examine the outcome of asymmetric alliances between SMEs and large and 
resourceful firms to examine the alliances strategies of SMEs in their international expansion. 
Through an analysis of the alliance ties between Japanese small- and medium-sized trading 
companies (SMTCs) and Sogo Shosha, I find that in general the alliance ties with Sogo Shosha 
enable SMTCs to increase the speed of internationalization. Results show that the positive effects 
of Sogo-Shosha ties will be stronger if SMTCs have fewer overlap in host country spread with 
their Sogo Shosha allies. On the other hand, these benefits of Sogo-Shosha ties would diminish 
when SMTCs become more embedded in the dyadic relationships with their giant partners. 
Results show that increasing number of joint ventures with Sogo Shosha bring no extra benefits 
to SM-trading companies in internationalization. Furthermore, the benefits of Sogo Shosha ties 
are also contingent on SMTCs’ alliance strategies with multiple giant partners. When SMTCs 
have formed more than two Sogo Shosha, the benefits of these alliances disappear. In general, 
this study shows that the alliances with Sogo Shosha could enhance SMTCs’ internationalization 
while these enhancements are modified by the resource match between partners, and SMTCs’ 
dependence on and loyalty to their Sogo Shosha.  
The first goal of this study is to enlarge the knowledge of firm’s strategy in the alliances 
where a high levels of partner asymmetries exist. Prior research recognizes that small firms could 
use alliances with large firms to complement their resource and capabilities in the international 
expansion (Lu and Beamish, 2001). However, as small firms have constrained internal resources 
and social network, they are more dependent on their large partners. The partner asymmetries in 
alliances bring difficulties to small firms to obtain benefits from the partnerships with large firms. 
While prior studies suggest some protection strategies in the preformation stage, the literature 
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provides little analysis of the strategies small firms can use to exploit the value of the alliances 
with large firms in the post-formation stages. This study provides strategies for small firms to use 
such alliances to enhance their status and creditability, and in turn, overcome the smallness and 
newness in international expansion. The analysis shows that it is critical for small firms to reduce 
their dependence on large partners and enhance their unique value to the latter. Small firms can 
also expect more benefits from the alliances when they show loyalty to their large partners, 
which can improve mutual trust and partner cohesion.  
This study calls for a view of value exchange that stresses the balance between 
cooperation and competition in a strategic alliance. Prior research on asymmetric alliance 
focuses on value appropriation and suggests small firms use a defensive strategy, such as patent 
strategy and secrecy protection, to avoid misappropriation (Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012; 
Katila et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2014). In general, this strategic thinking highlights the 
competition in interfirm cooperative relationships. While those strategies might protect firms 
from value misappropriation, they also pose the risks of partner conflicts and rivalry to the 
partnership. On the contrary, I contend that small firms should not pay too much attention to the 
competition against their large partners in the dyadic relationships, because small firms have 
little bargaining power. Moreover, the inter-partner competition will undermine the mutual trust 
and collaboration in the partnerships, and cause alliance instability (Park and Russo, 1996), 
which would be unaffordable to the small firms that are usually constrained in partnering and 
network resources. Instead, small firms should make efforts to enhance the mutual trust in the 
partnership and stress the cooperation of alliances. This study shows that if small firms could 
offer their unique value and keep their exclusivity to large firms, they could enhance mutual 
dependence and trust in the dyadic relationships and obtain more support from large partners. 
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Those findings help us understand the cooperation and competition between alliance partners and 
imply that the partner firms in the asymmetric alliance should enhance cooperation and reach a 
win-win situation.  
This study adds knowledge to research on the consequences of interfirm alliance to firms’ 
performance (Gulati, 1998). Scholars have found contradictory evidence for the question 
whether alliances bring extra value to the firms. Some studies on asymmetric alliances show that 
small and weak firms could benefit from their alliances with large and prestigious firms because 
they can enhance their prestige and status (Stuart et al., 1999). Some other studies find that small 
firms face the risks of value misappropriation and knowledge leakage in asymmetric alliances 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2001). This study reveals that whether the alliances with large firms are 
beneficial to small firms depend on the strategies of the latter. Small firms that could 
strategically manipulate the exchange of economic and social resources between partners could 
expect returns from asymmetric alliances. Those findings and theories can provide management 
implications for the managers that are running SMEs and considering the alliances with large and 
powerful firms.  
This study makes early steps in the studies of small-large-firm alliances by examining the 
general benefits of such asymmetric alliances for small firms. Using a data of international 
expansion, I test small firms’ gains in speeding up internationalization. Future studies could 
examine other benefits such as network expansion, financial performance, and firm survival. In 
this study, I look at the alliance outcome throughout the course of alliances. Future studies could 
investigate asymmetric alliances in different stages and small firms’ strategic choices 
accordingly. There are also high research potentials in small firms’ strategies of optimizing their 
alliance portfolio with their limited management resources. Moreover, this study looks at the 
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alliance strategy of small firms and use firm-level analysis. Future studies could use dyad-level 
analysis and integrate the perspective of large firms to examine the alliance behavior of two 
partners jointly.  It is an interesting question that how small and large firms coordinate or collude 
in overseas markets, such as competing with large-sized rivals and local firms. 
This study has some limitation that awaits further improvement. I use the asymmetric 
alliances between SMTCs and Sogo Shosha to test the alliance strategies of the former. Although 
this study focuses on the strategies of SMEs, I admit that the attributes of the large partners are 
relevant to this research question. Sogo Shosha is a unique type of industrial giant firms in Japan. 
On one hand, Sogo Shosha has the common attributes of large and resourceful firms as that in 
other countries. On the other hand, Sogo Shosha has its uniqueness in its trading business, global 
network, and business-group affiliation. Whether this unique setting provide generalizability 
remains a question to explore.  
Moreover, this study uses the joint ventures as the equity alliances to represent the 
alliances between SMEs and large and resourceful firms. One major reason is that the data 
provides only such a type of alliance that is observable. On the other hand, a joint venture that 
involves capital and resource investment from partners is observable and definite. However, 
studies using other types of alliances, such as R&D alliances, strategic alliances, or investment 
alliances could expand this research to a broad context. Moreover, I use the SMEs’ new FDI in 
foreign countries as their progress in internationalization. The international expansion of a firm, 
however, involves more complicated meanings. The measures such as export ratio, capital 
structure, and management style etc. can also reflect the degrees to which a firm is 
internationalized. Future studies with rich information of firms can test whether the same results 
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